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Provably Secure Code-Based Threshold Ring Signatures

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Cryptography and Coding (IMACC 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5921))

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Abstract

A threshold ring signature scheme enables a set of users to sign a message such that a finite set of possible signers (the ring) is identified, without revealing which subset of ring members actually produced the signature. A recent proposal of Aguillar et al. introduced the first code-based threshold ring signature scheme which large signatures (about 20KBytes per member of the ring for 80-bit security).

We propose a new code-based threshold ring signature scheme that achieves small signature size of 675N − 228ℓ bits, where N is the number of members in the ring and ℓ is the number of signers, for a security level of 80 bits. We give a security proof of our scheme whose security relies — in both random oracle and ideal cipher models — on two coding theory problems, making our scheme the first provably secure code-based threshold ring signature scheme. Unfortunately, as often in code-based cryptography, the presented scheme leads to very large public keys.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. GREYC – UMR 6072, Université de Caen, Campus Côte de Nacre, Boulevard du Maréchal Juin, 14050, Caen Cedex, France

    Léonard Dallot

  2. Ecole Normale Supérieure, C.N.R.S. – I.N.R.I.A., 45, Rue d’Ulm, 75230, Paris CEDEX 05, France

    Damien Vergnaud

Authors
  1. Léonard Dallot
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  2. Damien Vergnaud
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. The Selmer Centre Department of Informatics, University of Bergen, P.O. Box 7800, N-5020, Bergen, Norway

    Matthew G. Parker

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Dallot, L., Vergnaud, D. (2009). Provably Secure Code-Based Threshold Ring Signatures. In: Parker, M.G. (eds) Cryptography and Coding. IMACC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5921. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10868-6_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10868-6_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10867-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-10868-6

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