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Untraceable Tags Based on Mild Assumptions

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Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security (DPM 2009, SETOP 2009)

Abstract

Radio frequency identification (RFID) chips have been widely deployed in large-scale systems such as inventory control and supply chain management. While RFID technology has much advantage, however it may create new problems to privacy. Tag untraceability is a significant concern that needs to be addressed in deploying RFID-based system.

In this paper we propose a new construction for untraceable tags. Our construction is the first construction in the symmetric bilinear setting based on a mild assumption. That is our assumption is tautological in the generic group model and is “efficiently falsifiable” in the sense that its problem instances are stated non-interactively and concisely (i.e., independently of the number of adversarial queries and other large quantities).

The work of the authors has been supported in part by the European Commission through the FP7 Information Communication Technologies programme, under Contract FET-215270 FRONTS (Foundations of Adaptive Networked Societies of Tiny Artefacts).

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Blundo, C., De Caro, A., Persiano, G. (2010). Untraceable Tags Based on Mild Assumptions. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Navarro-Arribas, G., Cuppens-Boulahia, N., Roudier, Y. (eds) Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security. DPM SETOP 2009 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5939. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11207-2_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11207-2_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-11206-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-11207-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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