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An Algorithm for Generating Nash Stable Coalition Structures in Hedonic Games

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Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems (FoIKS 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5956))

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider a problem of generating Nash stable solutions in coalitional games. In particular, we present an algorithm for constructing the set of all Nash stable coalition structures from players’ preferences in a given additively separable hedonic game. We show the correctness and completeness of the algorithm. Our experiments with several classes of hedonic games demonstrate the usefulness and practical efficiency of the algorithm.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Information and Natural Sciences, Helsinki University of Technology, Finland

    Helena Keinänen

Authors
  1. Helena Keinänen
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Information Management, The Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand

    Sebastian Link

  2. IRIT, University of Toulouse III, 118 route de Narbonne, 31062, Toulouse, Cedex 9, France

    Henri Prade

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Keinänen, H. (2010). An Algorithm for Generating Nash Stable Coalition Structures in Hedonic Games. In: Link, S., Prade, H. (eds) Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems. FoIKS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5956. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11829-6_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11829-6_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-11828-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-11829-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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