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Practical Key Recovery Attack against Secret-IV Edon-\(\mathcal R\)

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Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2010 (CT-RSA 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 5985))

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Abstract

The SHA-3 competition has been organized by NIST to select a new hashing standard. Edon-\(\mathcal R\) was one of the fastest candidates in the first round of the competition. In this paper we study the security of Edon-\(\mathcal R\), and we show that using Edon-\(\mathcal R\) as a MAC with the secret-IV or secret-prefix construction is unsafe. We present a practical attack in the case of Edon-\(\mathcal R\)[256], which requires 32 queries, 230 computations, negligible memory, and a precomputation of 252. The main part of our attack can also be adapted to the tweaked Edon-\(\mathcal R\) in the same settings: it does not yield a key-recovery attack, but it allows a selective forgery attack.

This does not directly contradict the security claims of Edon-\(\mathcal R\) or the NIST requirements for SHA-3, since the recommended mode to build a MAC is HMAC. However, we believe that it shows a major weakness in the design.

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Leurent, G. (2010). Practical Key Recovery Attack against Secret-IV Edon-\(\mathcal R\) . In: Pieprzyk, J. (eds) Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2010. CT-RSA 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5985. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11925-5_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11925-5_23

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-11924-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-11925-5

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