Abstract
We study the quality of equilibrium in atomic splittable routing games. We show that in single-source single-sink games on series-parallel graphs, the price of collusion — the ratio of the total delay of atomic Nash equilibrium to the Wardrop equilibrium — is at most 1. This proves that the existing bounds on the price of anarchy for Wardrop equilibria carry over to atomic splittable routing games in this setting.
This work was supported in part by NSF grant CCF-0728869.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ahuja, R.K., Magnanti, T.L., Orlin, J.B.: Network Flows. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs (1993)
Altman, E., Basar, T., Jimenez, T., Shimkin, N.: Competitive routing in networks with polynomial costs. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 47(1), 92–96 (2002)
Awerbuch, B., Azar, Y., Epstein, A.: The price of routing unsplittable flow. In: STOC, pp. 57–66. ACM, New York (2005)
Beckmann, M., McGuire, C.B., Winsten, C.B.: Studies in the Economics of Transportation. Yale University Press, New Haven (1956)
Bhaskar, U., Fleischer, L., Hoy, D., Huang, C.-C.: Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique. In: SODA, pp. 748–757 (2009)
Bhaskar, U., Fleischer, L., Huang, C.-C.: The price of collusion in series-parallel networks (unpublished manuscript 2010)
Catoni, S., Pallottino, S.: Traffic equilibrium paradoxes. Transportation Science 25(3), 240–244 (1991)
Cominetti, R., Correa, J.R., Stier-Moses, N.E.: The impact of oligopolistic competition in networks. Operations Research 57(6), 1421–1437 (2009)
Correa, J.R., Schulz, A.S., Stier-Moses, N.E.: On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games. In: Jünger, M., Kaibel, V. (eds.) IPCO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3509, pp. 167–181. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Fotakis, D., Spirakis, P.: Selfish unsplittable flows. In: TCS, pp. 593–605. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Harker, P.: Multiple equilibrium behaviors on networks. Transportation Science 22(1), 39–46 (1988)
Harks, T.: Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow. In: Bampis, E., Skutella, M. (eds.) WAOA 2008. LNCS, vol. 5426, pp. 133–146. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Hayrapetyan, A., Tardos, É., Wexler, T.: The effect of collusion in congestion games. In: STOC, pp. 89–98. ACM Press, New York (2006)
Milchtaich, I.: Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior 57(2), 321–346 (2006)
Nocedal, J., Wright, S.T.: Numerical Optimization. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Orda, A., Rom, R., Shimkin, N.: Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 1(5), 510–521 (1993)
Rosen, J.B.: Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave n-person games. Econometrica 33(3), 520–534 (1965)
Rosenthal, R.W.: A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria. Intl. J. of Game Theory 2, 65–67 (1973)
Roughgarden, T.: Selfish routing with atomic players. In: SODA, pp. 1184–1185 (2005)
Roughgarden, T.: The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 67(2), 341–364 (2003)
Roughgarden, T.: Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy. The MIT Press, Cambridge (2005)
Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E.: How bad is selfish routing? Journal of the ACM 49(2), 236–259 (2002)
Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E.: Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games. Games and Economic Behavior 47, 389–403 (2004)
Wardrop, J.G.: Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research. In: Proc. Institute of Civil Engineers, Pt. II, vol. 1, pp. 325–378 (1952)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Bhaskar, U., Fleischer, L., Huang, CC. (2010). The Price of Collusion in Series-Parallel Networks. In: Eisenbrand, F., Shepherd, F.B. (eds) Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization. IPCO 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6080. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13036-6_24
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13036-6_24
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-13035-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-13036-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)