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The Price of Collusion in Series-Parallel Networks

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Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (IPCO 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6080))

Abstract

We study the quality of equilibrium in atomic splittable routing games. We show that in single-source single-sink games on series-parallel graphs, the price of collusion — the ratio of the total delay of atomic Nash equilibrium to the Wardrop equilibrium — is at most 1. This proves that the existing bounds on the price of anarchy for Wardrop equilibria carry over to atomic splittable routing games in this setting.

This work was supported in part by NSF grant CCF-0728869.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, 03755, U.S.A.

    Umang Bhaskar & Lisa Fleischer

  2. Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik, Saarbrücken, 66123, Germany

    Chien-Chung Huang

Authors
  1. Umang Bhaskar
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  2. Lisa Fleischer
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  3. Chien-Chung Huang
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics, École Polytechnique Féderale de Lausanne, 1015, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Friedrich Eisenbrand

  2. McGill University, 805 Sherbrooke West, H3A 2K6, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

    F. Bruce Shepherd

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Bhaskar, U., Fleischer, L., Huang, CC. (2010). The Price of Collusion in Series-Parallel Networks. In: Eisenbrand, F., Shepherd, F.B. (eds) Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization. IPCO 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6080. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13036-6_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13036-6_24

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-13035-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-13036-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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