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Price Differentiation All-Pay Auction-Based Incentives in BitTorrent

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Advances in Grid and Pervasive Computing (GPC 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6104))

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Abstract

Free riding, the behavior of attempting to benefit resources contributed by others while sharing their own values as minimum as possible, is one of the key problems in many P2P systems. Incentive mechanisms are proposed to solve the problem. In this paper, we introduce an all-pay auction model to study the resource distribution process in BitTorrent-like P2P system. Based on this model, the advantages and disadvantages of original BitTorrent incentives are presented. To improve the BitTorrent system-wide performance, we propose a price differentiation all-pay auction based incentive mechanism considering the long-term share ratio and the short-term predicted upload bandwidth comprehensively. Our simulation results verify the effectiveness of the new incentive mechanism to prevent free-riders and strategic peers.

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Pang, Y., Guo, Z. (2010). Price Differentiation All-Pay Auction-Based Incentives in BitTorrent. In: Bellavista, P., Chang, RS., Chao, HC., Lin, SF., Sloot, P.M.A. (eds) Advances in Grid and Pervasive Computing. GPC 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6104. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13067-0_71

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13067-0_71

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-13066-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-13067-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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