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Tree-Homomorphic Encryption and Scalable Hierarchical Secret-Ballot Elections

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6052))

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Abstract

In this work we present a new paradigm for trust and work distribution in a hierarchy of servers that aims to achieve scalability of work and trust simultaneously. The paradigm is implemented with a decryption capability which is distributed and forces a workflow along a tree structure, enforcing distribution of the workload as well as fairness and partial disclosure (privacy) properties. We call the method “tree-homomorphic” since it extends traditional homomorphic encryption and we exemplify its usage within a large scale election scheme, showing how it contributes to the properties that such a scheme needs. We note that existing design models over which e-voting schemes have been designed for, do not adapt to scale with respect to a combination of privacy and trust (fairness); thus we present a model emphasizing the scaling of privacy and fairness in parallel to the growth and distribution of the election structure. We present two instantiations of e-voting schemes that are robust, publicly verifiable, and support multiple candidate ballot casting employing tree-homomorphic encryption schemes. We extend the scheme to allow the voters in a smallest administrated election unit to employ a security mechanism that protects their privacy even if all authorities are corrupt.

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Kiayias, A., Yung, M. (2010). Tree-Homomorphic Encryption and Scalable Hierarchical Secret-Ballot Elections. In: Sion, R. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6052. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_20

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-14576-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-14577-3

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