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Thin Rationality and Representation of Preferences with Implications to Spatial Voting Models

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Preferences and Decisions

Part of the book series: Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing ((STUDFUZZ,volume 257))

Introduction

Much of current micro economic theory and formal political science is based on the notion of thin rationality. This concept refers to the behavioral principle stating that rational people act according to their preferences. More precisely, a rational individual chooses A rather than B just in case he/she (hereafter he) prefers A to B. Provided that the individual’s preference is a binary, connected and transitive relation over alternative courses of action, we can define a utility function that represents the individual’s preferences so that when acting rationally - i.e. in accordance with his preferences - he acts as if he were maximizing his utility. When considering risky alternatives, i.e. probability mixtures of certain outcomes, similar representation theorem states that the individual’s preferences can be represented as a utility function with an expected utility property. These utility functions assign risky prospects utility values than coincide with weighted sums of the utility values of those outcomes that may materialize in the prospect. The weights, in turn, are identical with the probabilities of the corresponding outcomes.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Public Choice Research Centre, and, Department of Political Science, University of Turku, FI-20014, Turku, Finland

    Hannu Nurmi

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  1. Hannu Nurmi
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Catania, Corso Italia 55, 95129, Catania, Italy

    Salvatore Greco

  2. Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Via Inama 5, 38122, Trento, Italy

    Ricardo Alberto Marques Pereira

  3. Department of Economical and Social Sciences, University of Sannio at Benevento, Via delle Puglie, 82100, Benevento, Italy

    Massimo Squillante

  4. Machine Intelligence Institute, Iona College, 10801, New Rochelle, NY, USA

    Ronald R. Yager

  5. Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Newelska 6, 01–447, Warsaw, Poland

    Janusz Kacprzyk

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Nurmi, H. (2010). Thin Rationality and Representation of Preferences with Implications to Spatial Voting Models. In: Greco, S., Marques Pereira, R.A., Squillante, M., Yager, R.R., Kacprzyk, J. (eds) Preferences and Decisions. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 257. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15976-3_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15976-3_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-15975-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-15976-3

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