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Identification Schemes of Proofs of Ability Secure against Concurrent Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

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Provable Security (ProvSec 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6402))

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Abstract

We give a series of three identification schemes. All of them are basically 2-round interactive proofs of ability to complete Diffie-Hellman tuples. Despite their simple protocols, the second and the third schemes are proven secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks based on tight reduction to the Gap Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption without the random oracle. In addition, they are more efficient than challenge-and-response 2-round identification schemes from previously known EUF-CMA signature schemes in the standard model.

Our first scheme is similar to half the operation of Diffie-Hellman Key-Exchange. The first scheme is secure only against two-phase attacks based on strong assumptions. Applying the tag framework, and employing a strong one-time signature for the third scheme, we get the preferable schemes above.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Information Security, Yokohama, Japan

    Hiroaki Anada & Seiko Arita

Authors
  1. Hiroaki Anada
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  2. Seiko Arita
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Information Science and Technology, Jalan Ayer Keroh Lama, Multimedia University, 75450, Malacca, Malaysia

    Swee-Huay Heng

  2. Department of Computer and Information Sciences, Ibaraki University, 4-12-1 Nakanarusawa, 316-8511, Hitachi, Ibaraki, Japan

    Kaoru Kurosawa

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Anada, H., Arita, S. (2010). Identification Schemes of Proofs of Ability Secure against Concurrent Man-in-the-Middle Attacks. In: Heng, SH., Kurosawa, K. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6402. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16280-0_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16280-0_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-16279-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-16280-0

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