Abstract
Node capture is considered as one of the most critical issues in the security of wireless sensor networks. A popular approach to thwart the problem relies on the detection of events that arise during the attack such as the removal of a node for instance. However, certain attacks, such as side-channel attacks, might be furtive and defeat this type of defense. This work clarifies this question by performing a case study of power analysis attacks on AES and ECC implementations on two common types of nodes: the MICAz and the TelosB. From our experiments, the attacks can be carried out in a stealthy manner. As a result, stealthy node compromises should be considered when securing wireless sensor networks. Also, the moderate complexity of our attacks underlines the importance of low-cost side-channel countermeasures for sensor nodes.
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de Meulenaer, G., Standaert, FX. (2010). Stealthy Compromise of Wireless Sensor Nodes with Power Analysis Attacks. In: Chatzimisios, P., Verikoukis, C., Santamaría, I., Laddomada, M., Hoffmann, O. (eds) Mobile Lightweight Wireless Systems. Mobilight 2010. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 45. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16644-0_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16644-0_21
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