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Leakage-Resilient RFID Authentication with Forward-Privacy

  • Conference paper
Radio Frequency Identification: Security and Privacy Issues (RFIDSec 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6370))

Abstract

Low power devices, such as smart-card and RFID-tags, will be used around our life including in commercial and financial activities. A prime application of such devices is entity authentication in pervasive environment. The obvious concerns in this environment involves getting security against tag-forgery (even by adversary controlled readers) and, on the other hand, giving users privacy against linking of different authentication transcripts. Many cryptographic protocols have realizes such requirements. However, there is no scheme which realizes, both, forward-privacy and tag-forgery right after some leakage is occurred. Since some devices among the huge quantity of expected devices will surely be compromised, it seems highly important, from an engineering point of view, to deal with limited damage of such exposures. In this paper, we address the gap by proposing the first RFID scheme that realizes both requirements.

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Matsuo, S., Phong, L.T., Ohkubo, M., Yung, M. (2010). Leakage-Resilient RFID Authentication with Forward-Privacy. In: Ors Yalcin, S.B. (eds) Radio Frequency Identification: Security and Privacy Issues. RFIDSec 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6370. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16822-2_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16822-2_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-16821-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-16822-2

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