Abstract
Coercion-resistance is the most effective property to fight coercive attacks in Internet elections. This notion was introduced by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (JCJ) at WPES 2005 together with a voting protocol that satisfies such a stringent security requirement. Unfortunately, their scheme has a quadratic complexity (the overhead for tallying authorities is quadratic in the number of votes) and would therefore not be suitable for large scale elections. Based on the work of JCJ, Schweisgut proposed a more efficient scheme. In this paper, we first show that Schweisgut’s scheme is insecure. In particular, we describe an attack that allows a coercer to check whether a voter followed or not his instructions. We then present a new coercion-resistant election scheme with a linear complexity that overcomes the drawbacks of these previous proposals. Our solution relies on special anonymous credentials and is proven secure, in the random oracle model, under the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman and Strong Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumptions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Araújo, R.: On Remote and Voter-Verifiable Voting. PhD thesis, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany (September 2008)
Araújo, R., Foulle, S., Traoré, J.: A practical and secure coercion-resistant scheme for remote elections. In: Chaum, D., Kutylowski, M., Rivest, R.L., Ryan, P.Y.A. (eds.) Frontiers of Electronic Voting, Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Dagstuhl, Germany, vol. 07311, Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum für Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany (2008)
Boneh, D.: The decision diffie-hellman problem. In: Buhler, J. (ed.) ANTS 1998. LNCS, vol. 1423, pp. 48–63. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Boneh, D., Boyen, X.: Short signatures without random oracles. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 56–73. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Boneh, D., Boyen, X., Shacham, H.: Short group signatures. In: Franklin, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2004. LNCS, vol. 3152, pp. 41–55. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Brickell, E.F. (ed.): CRYPTO 1992. LNCS, vol. 740. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)
Cachin, C., Kursawe, K., Shoup, V.: Random oracles in constantipole: practical asynchronous byzantine agreement using cryptography (extended abstract). In: Neiger, G. (ed.) PODC, pp. 123–132. ACM, New York (2000)
Camenisch, J., Hohenberger, S., Kohlweiss, M., Lysyanskaya, A., Meyerovich, M.: How to win the clone wars: efficient periodic n-times anonymous authentication. In: Juels, A., Wright, R.N., De Capitani di Vimercati, S. (eds.) ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 201–210. ACM, New York (2006)
Camenisch, J., Kiayias, A., Yung, M.: On the portability of generalized schnorr proofs. In: Joux, A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5479, pp. 425–442. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Camenisch, J., Shoup, V.: Practical verifiable encryption and decryption of discrete logarithms. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 126–144. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Canetti, R., Gennaro, R.: Incoercible multiparty computation (extended abstract). In: FOCS, pp. 504–513 (1996)
Chaum, D.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24(2), 84–88 (1981)
Chaum, D., Pedersen, T.P.: Wallet databases with observers. In: Brickell [6], pp. 89–105
Clarkson, M.R., Chong, S., Myers, A.C.: Civitas: Toward a secure voting system. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 354–368. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2008)
Clarkson, M.R., Myers, A.C.: Coercion-resistant remote voting using decryption mixes. In: Workshop on Frontiers in Electronic Elections (2005)
Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1986)
Fuchsbauer, G., Pointcheval, D., Vergnaud, D.: Transferable constant-size fair e-cash. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/146 (2009), http://eprint.iacr.org/
Furukawa, J., Sako, K.: An efficient publicly verifiable mix-net for long inputs. In: Di Crescenzo, G., Rubin, A. (eds.) FC 2006. LNCS, vol. 4107, pp. 111–125. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
El Gamal, T.: A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms. In: Blakely, G.R., Chaum, D. (eds.) CRYPTO 1984. LNCS, vol. 196, pp. 10–18. Springer, Heidelberg (1984)
Jakobsson, M., Juels, A.: Mix and match: Secure function evaluation via ciphertexts. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 162–177. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Jefferson, D., Rubin, A., Simons, B., Wagner, D.: A security analysis of the secure electronic registration and voting experiment (2004)
Juels, A., Catalano, D., Jakobsson, M.: Coercion-resistant electronic elections. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2002/165 (2002), http://eprint.iacr.org/
Juels, A., Catalano, D., Jakobsson, M.: Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In: Atluri, V., De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Dingledine, R. (eds.) WPES, pp. 61–70. ACM, New York (2005)
Kuesters, R., Truderung, T., Vogt, A.: A game-based definition of coercion-resistance and its applications. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/582 (2009), http://eprint.iacr.org/
Moran, T., Naor, M.: Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 373–392. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Neff, C.A.: A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 116–125 (2001)
Okamoto, T.: Provably secure and practical identification schemes and corresponding signature schemes. In: Brickell (ed.) [6], pp. 31–53 (1992)
Schnorr, C.-P.: Efficient signature generation by smart cards. J. Cryptology 4(3), 161–174 (1991)
Schweisgut, J.: Coercion-resistant electronic elections with observer. In: Krimmer, R. (ed.) Electronic Voting. LNI, vol. 86, pp. 171–177. GI (2006)
Smith, W.: New cryptographic election protocol with best-known theoretical properties. In: Workshop on Frontiers in Electronic Elections (2005)
Unruh, D., Müller-Quade, J.: Universally composable incoercibility. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/520 (2009), http://eprint.iacr.org/
Weber, S.G., Araújo, R., Buchmann, J.: On coercion-resistant electronic elections with linear work. In: 2nd Workshop on Dependability and Security in e-Government (DeSeGov 2007) at 2nd Int. Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2007), pp. 908–916. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2007)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Araújo, R., Ben Rajeb, N., Robbana, R., Traoré, J., Youssfi, S. (2010). Towards Practical and Secure Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections. In: Heng, SH., Wright, R.N., Goi, BM. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6467. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17619-7_20
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17619-7_20
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17618-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17619-7
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)