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One Time Anonymous Certificate: X.509 Supporting Anonymity

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Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6467))

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Abstract

It is widely admitted that group signatures are today one of the most important cryptographic tool regarding privacy enhancing technologies. As evidence, the ISO organization has began a subject on authentication mechanisms supporting anonymity, in which group signatures are largely studied. However, it seems difficult to embed group signatures into other standards designed for classical authentication and signature mechanisms, such as the PKI X.509 certification. In fact, X.509 public key certificates are today widely used but not designed to support anonymity. One attempt has been done by Benjumea et al. but with the drawback that (i) the solution loses the principle of one certification per signer, (ii) revocation cannot be performed efficiently and (iii) the proposed architecture can not be applied to anonymous credentials, a concept close to group signature and today implemented by IBM or Microsoft. This paper presents a new approach which permits to use the X.509 standard to group signature schemes and anonymous credentials in a more standard and efficient way than related work.

This work has been financially supported by the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche under the PACE project and by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) under contract number ICT-2007-216676 ECRYPT II, while 1st author was working at Orange Labs.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Logica IT Service, 17 place des Reflets, 92097, Paris la Défense Cedex, France

    Aymen Abed

  2. Orange Labs, 42 rue des Coutures - BP6234, F-14066, Caen Cedex, France

    Sébastien Canard

Authors
  1. Aymen Abed
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  2. Sébastien Canard
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Information Science and Technology, Multimedia University, Jalan Ayer Keroh Lama, 75450, Melaka, Malaysia

    Swee-Huay Heng

  2. Department of Computer Science, Rutgers University, 96 Frelinghuysen Road, 08854, Piscataway, NJ, USA

    Rebecca N. Wright

  3. Faculty of Engineering and Science, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman, Kuala Lumpur Campus, Jalan Genting Klang, 53300, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

    Bok-Min Goi

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Abed, A., Canard, S. (2010). One Time Anonymous Certificate: X.509 Supporting Anonymity. In: Heng, SH., Wright, R.N., Goi, BM. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6467. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17619-7_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17619-7_23

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17618-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17619-7

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