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Language, Games, and Evolution: An Introduction

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Language, Games, and Evolution

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 6207))

Introduction

Recent years have witnessed an increased interest in formal pragmatics and especially the establishment of game theory as a new research methodology for the study of language use. Within this field of research, three major currents can be distinguished: one is closely related to the Gricean paradigm and aims at a precise foundation of pragmatic reasoning, the second originates in the economic literature and is concerned with the role of game theory in the context of language use, and the third aims at language evolution seen either from a biological or from a cultural perspective.

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Benz, A., Ebert, C., Jäger, G., van Rooij, R. (2011). Language, Games, and Evolution: An Introduction. In: Benz, A., Ebert, C., Jäger, G., van Rooij, R. (eds) Language, Games, and Evolution. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6207. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18006-4_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18006-4_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-18005-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-18006-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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