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A Short Signature Scheme from the RSA Family

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Information Security (ISC 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6531))

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Abstract

We propose a short signature scheme based on the complexity assumptions related to the RSA modulus. More specifically, the new scheme is secure in the standard model based on the strong RSA subgroup assumption. Most short signature schemes are based on either the discrete logarithm problem (or its variants), or the problems from bilinear mapping. So far we are not aware of any signature schemes in the RSA family can produce a signature shorter than the RSA modulus (in a typical setting, an RSA modulus is 1024 bits). The new scheme can produce a 420-bit signature, much shorter than the RSA modulus. In addition, the new scheme is very efficient. It only needs one modulo exponentiation with a 200-bit exponent to produce a signature. In comparison, most RSA-type signature schemes at least need one modulo exponentiation with 1024-bit exponent, whose cost is more than five times of the new scheme’s.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China, 100190

    Ping Yu & Rui Xue

Authors
  1. Ping Yu
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  2. Rui Xue
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Security and Assurance in IT (C-SAIT), Department of Computer Science, Florida State University, 32306-4530, Tallahassee, FL, USA

    Mike Burmester

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of California, Irvine, 92697-3425, CA, USA

    Gene Tsudik

  3. Center for Cryptology and Information Security (CCIS), Department of Mathematical Sciences, Florida Atlantic University, 33431-0991, Boca Raton, FL, USA

    Spyros Magliveras

  4. Mathematical Sciences Department, Florida Atlantic University, 33431-0991, Boca Raton, FL, USA

    Ivana Ilić

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Yu, P., Xue, R. (2011). A Short Signature Scheme from the RSA Family. In: Burmester, M., Tsudik, G., Magliveras, S., Ilić, I. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6531. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-18177-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-18178-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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