Abstract
The assignment problem has a wide variety of applications and in particular, it can be applied to any two-sided market. In this paper, we propose a multi-agent framework to distributively solve this kind of assignment problems, by providing agents which negotiate with respect to their preferences. We present here a realisation of the minimal concession strategy. Our realisation of the minimal concession strategy has useful properties: it preserves the privacy and improves the optimality of the solution and the equity amongst the partners.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Arrow, K., Sen, A., Suzumura, K.: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2002)
Bordini, R.H., Hubner, J.F., Wooldridge, M.: Programming Multi-Agent Systems in AgentSpeak Using Jason. John Wiley & Sons Ltd., Chichester (2007)
Brito, I., Meseguer, P.: Distributed stable marriage problem. In: 6th Workshop on Distributed Constraint Reasoning at IJCAI 2005, pp. 135–147 (2005)
Bromuri, S., Urovi, V., Morge, M., Toni, F., Stathis, K.: A multi-agent system for service discovery, selection and negotiation (demonstration). In: 8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2009), pp. 1395–1396. IFAAMAS (2009)
Chevaleyre, Y., Dunne, P.E., Endriss, U., Lang, J., Lematre, M., Maudet, N., Padget, J., Phelps, S., Rodrguez-Aguilar, J.A., Sousa, P.: Issues in multiagent resource allocation. Informatica 30, 3–31 (2006)
Gale, D., Shapley, L.S.: College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–14 (1962)
Gent, I.P., Prosser, P.: An empirical study of the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete lists. In: ECAI 2002, pp. 141–145 (2002)
Morge, M., Mancarella, P.: Assumption-based argumentation for the minimal concession strategy. In: McBurney, P., Rahwan, I., Parsons, S., Maudet, N. (eds.) ArgMAS 2009. LNCS, vol. 6057, pp. 114–133. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Rosenschein, J.S., Zlotkin, G.: Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among Computers. The MIT press series of artificial intelligence. MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)
Shoham, Y., Leyton-Brown, K.: Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2009)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Morge, M., Picard, G. (2011). Privacy-Preserving Strategy for Negotiating Stable, Equitable and Optimal Matchings. In: Demazeau, Y., Pěchoucěk, M., Corchado, J.M., Pérez, J.B. (eds) Advances on Practical Applications of Agents and Multiagent Systems. Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, vol 88. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19875-5_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19875-5_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-19874-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-19875-5
eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)