Abstract
In the context of optimization problems of an agent, having more information without additional cost is always beneficial is a classic result by D. Blackwell (1953). Nevertheless, in the context of strategic interaction this is not always true. Under what conditions more information is (socially) beneficial in games? Existing literature varies between two ends: on the one hand, we find works that calculate the information value of particular cases not always easy to generalize; on the other hand, there are also abstract studies which make difficult the analysis of more concrete applications. In order to fill this gap, we calculated the information value in the general case of constrained quadratic games in the framework of Hilbert spaces. As a result of our work we found a close relationship between the symmetry of information and the mathematical property of invariance (of subspaces). Such property is the base to calculate the information value and demonstrating its non-negativity. Such results improve the understanding of general conditions that assure the non-negativity of information value. In the immediate thing, this work can be extended to the study of other payoff functions with more general constraints.
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Laengle, S., Flores-Bazán, F. (2011). Non-Negativity of Information Value in Games, Symmetry and Invariance. In: Hu, B., Morasch, K., Pickl, S., Siegle, M. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2010. Operations Research Proceedings. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20009-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20009-0_10
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