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Recent Developments in the Mechanism Design Problem for Scheduling

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Frontiers in Algorithmics and Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6681))

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Abstract

Scheduling unrelated machines is a classical optimization problem in which we want to minimize the makespan of executing m tasks on n machines when machine i can execute task j in time t ij . Nisan and Ronen [6] posed the following problem: if the machines are selfish, how well can an incentive compatible mechanism approximate the minimum makespan? This is an important multiparameter problem in mechanism design and this question has been one of primary motivating problems in algorithmic game theory.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Athens, Greece

    Elias Koutsoupias

Authors
  1. Elias Koutsoupias
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Purdue University, 305 North University Street, 47907, West Lafayette, IN, USA

    Mikhail Atallah

  2. Department of Computer Science, Illinois Institute of Technology, 60616, Chicago, IL, USA

    Xiang-Yang Li

  3. Department of Computer Science, Montana State University, EPS 357, 59717, Bozeman, MT, USA

    Binhai Zhu

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Koutsoupias, E. (2011). Recent Developments in the Mechanism Design Problem for Scheduling. In: Atallah, M., Li, XY., Zhu, B. (eds) Frontiers in Algorithmics and Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6681. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21204-8_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21204-8_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-21203-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-21204-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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