Abstract
Whether by nature or nurture, humans often respond differently when facing the same situation. Yet, the role of behavioral differences between individuals when immersed in their social network remains largely ignored in most problems of natural and social sciences. Here, we investigate how diversity in the way individuals assess their adverse social partners affects the evolution of cooperation. We resort to evolutionary game theory (EGT) to describe the dynamics of populations in which individuals interact according to an adaptive social network and may respond differently to unwanted social interactions. We show that increasing the number of ways of responding to adverse ties in the population always promotes cooperation. As such, adaptive social dynamics and behavioral differences benefit the entire community even though myopic individuals still act in their own interest. As defectors are wiped out, surviving cooperators maintain the full diversity of behavioral types, providing the means to establish cooperation as a robust evolutionary strategy.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Buchan, N., Croson, R., Dawes, R.: Swift neighbors and persistent strangers: a cross-cultural investigation of trust and reciprocity in social exchange. Am. J. Soc. 108, 168 (2002)
Gintis, H.: Game Theory Evolving. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2000)
Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M.A., Sigmund, K.: Via freedom to coercion: The emergence of costly punishment. Science 316(5833), 1905 (2007)
Hofbauer, J., Sigmund, K.: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1998)
Imhof, L.A., Fudenberg, D., Nowak, M.A.: Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection. P. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 102(31), 10797 (2005)
Kossinets, G., Watts, D.J.: Empirical analysis of an evolving social network. Science 311(5757), 88 (2006)
Maynard Smith, J.: Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1982)
Nowak, M.A.: Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314, 1560–1563 (2006)
Nowak, M.A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C., Fudenberg, D.: Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428, 646 (2004)
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., Nowak, M.A.: A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs. Nature 441, 502–505 (2006)
Pacheco, J.M., Traulsen, A., Nowak, M.A.: Active linking in evolutionary games. J. Theor. Biol. 243, 437 (2006)
Pacheco, J.M., Traulsen, A., Nowak, M.A.: Coevolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking. Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 258103 (2006)
Rapoport, A., Chammah, A.M.: Prisoner’s Dilemma. Univ. of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor (1965)
Santos, F.C., Pacheco, J.M.: Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation. Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 98104 (2005)
Santos, F.C., Pacheco, J.M., Lenaerts, T.: Cooperation prevails when individuals adjust their social ties. PLoS Comput. Biol. 2(10), e140 (2006)
Santos, F.C., Pacheco, J.M., Lenaerts, T.: Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations. P. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 103(9), 3490 (2006)
Santos, F.C., Santos, M.D., Pacheco, J.M.: Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games. Nature 454, 213 (2008)
Van Segbroeck, S., Santos, F.C., Nowe, A., Pacheco, J.M., Lenaerts, T.: The evolution of prompt reaction to adverse ties. BMC Evol. Biol. 8(287) (2008)
Szabó, G., Fáth, G.: Evolutionary games on graphs. Phys. Rep. 446(4-6), 97 (2007)
Szabó, G., Tőke, C.: Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game on a square lattice. Phys. Rev. E 58, 69 (1998)
Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., Szabó, G.: Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game on complex networks. Eur. Phys. J. B 61, 505 (2008)
Traulsen, A., Nowak, M.A., Pacheco, J.M.: Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation. Phys. Rev. E 74, 11909 (2006)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Van Segbroeck, S., Santos, F.C., Lenaerts, T., Pacheco, J.M. (2011). Emergence of Cooperation in Adaptive Social Networks with Behavioral Diversity. In: Kampis, G., Karsai, I., Szathmáry, E. (eds) Advances in Artificial Life. Darwin Meets von Neumann. ECAL 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5777. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21283-3_54
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21283-3_54
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-21282-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-21283-3
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)