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Multi-Factor Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in the Three-Party Setting

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Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6584))

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Abstract

A great deal of authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have been proposed in recent years. Most of them were based on 1-factor authentication. In order to increase the security for AKE protocols, various authentication means can be used together. In fact, the existing multi-factor AKE protocols provide an authenticated key exchange only between a client and a server. This paper presents a new multi-factor AKE protocol in the three-party settings (3MFAKE), in which the authentication means combine a password, a secure device, and biometric authentications. We also prove the security of the protocol in the random oracle model.

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Liu, Y., Wei, F., Ma, C. (2011). Multi-Factor Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in the Three-Party Setting. In: Lai, X., Yung, M., Lin, D. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6584. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21518-6_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21518-6_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-21517-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-21518-6

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