Abstract
In this paper, to analyze equilibrium selection and coordination failure in coordination games, we develop an agent-based simulation system in which artificial adaptive agents have a mechanism of decision making and learning based on neural networks and genetic algorithms. Using the simulation system, we examine the strategy choices of agents and formation of equilibria in the steady state, and compare the experimental result given by [Van Huyck et al. (1990)] with our simulation result.
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Nishizaki, I., Hayashida, T., Hara, N. (2011). Agent-Based Simulation for Equilibrium Selection and Coordination Failure in Minimum Strategy Coordination Games. In: O’Shea, J., Nguyen, N.T., Crockett, K., Howlett, R.J., Jain, L.C. (eds) Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications. KES-AMSTA 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6682. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22000-5_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22000-5_28
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-21999-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-22000-5
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