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A Generic Variant of NIST’s KAS2 Key Agreement Protocol

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6812))

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Abstract

We propose a generic three-pass key agreement protocol that is based on a certain kind of trapdoor one-way function family. When specialized to the RSA setting, the generic protocol yields the so-called KAS2 scheme that has recently been standardized by NIST. On the other hand, when specialized to the discrete log setting, we obtain a new protocol which we call DH2. An interesting feature of DH2 is that parties can use different groups (e.g., different elliptic curves). The generic protocol also has a hybrid implementation, where one party has an RSA key pair and the other party has a discrete log key pair. The security of KAS2 and DH2 is analyzed in an appropriate modification of the extended Canetti-Krawczyk security model.

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Chatterjee, S., Menezes, A., Ustaoglu, B. (2011). A Generic Variant of NIST’s KAS2 Key Agreement Protocol. In: Parampalli, U., Hawkes, P. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6812. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22497-3_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22497-3_23

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-22496-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-22497-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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