Abstract
In this paper, we consider a dynamic revenue-sharing problem between a platform and a seller in e-commerce. We formulate the revenue-sharing problem as a dynamic principal-agent problem, which is then transformed to a stochastic optimal control problem where the objectives of the platform are to find an optimal revenue-sharing strategy and to advise an incentive-compatible effort to the seller. The sufficient conditions for the existences of the optimal revenue-sharing strategy and the incentive-compatible effort are obtained. A numerical example is solved to show the existences of the strategy and the effort.
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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Unno, M., Xu, H. (2011). Dynamic Optimal Revenue-Sharing Strategy in E-Commerce. In: König, A., Dengel, A., Hinkelmann, K., Kise, K., Howlett, R.J., Jain, L.C. (eds) Knowledge-Based and Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems. KES 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6883. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23854-3_33
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23854-3_33
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-23853-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-23854-3
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