Abstract
Extensive research on modern cryptography ensures significant mathematical immunity to conventional cryptographic attacks. However, power consumption in cryptographic hardware leak secret information. Differential power analysis attack (DPA) is such a powerful tool to extract the secret key from cryptographic devices. To defend against these DPA attacks, hiding and masking methods are widely used. But these methods increase high area overhead and performance degradation in hardware implementation. In this aspect, this paper proposes a hardware countermeasure circuit, which, is integrated hardware module with the intermediate stages in S-Box. The countermeasure circuit utilizes the dynamic power dissipation characteristics of CMOS and provides countermeasure against DPA attacks.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Quisquater, J.J., Rizk, M.: Side Channel attacks. Information-technology promotion agency, Japan technical report (October 2002) http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/fy15/doc/1047_Side_Channel_report.pdf
Kocher, P.C., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, p. 388. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Brier, E., Clavier, C., Olivier, F.: Correlation Power Analysis with a Leakage Model. In: vol. 1. Springer, Heidelberg (1973); vol. 6697 (2011), 0302-9743 (Print) 1611-3349 (Online)
Clavier, C., Coron, J.-S., Dabbous, N.: Differential power analysis in the presence of hardware countermeasures. In: Paar, C., Koç, Ç.K. (eds.) CHES 2000. LNCS, vol. 1965, pp. 252–263. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Coron, J.-S., Goubin, L.: On Boolean and arithmetic masking against differential power analysis. In: Paar, C., Koç, Ç.K. (eds.) CHES 2000. LNCS, vol. 1965, pp. 231–237. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Coron, J.-S., Kocher, P.C., Naccache, D.: Statistics and secret leakage. In: Frankel, Y. (ed.) FC 2000. LNCS, vol. 1962, pp. 157–173. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Mayer-Sommer, R.: Smartly analyzing the simplicity and the power of simple power analysis on smartcards. In: Paar, C., Koç, Ç.K. (eds.) CHES 2000. LNCS, vol. 1965, pp. 78–92. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Messerges, T.S.: Using second-order power analysis to attack DPA resistant software. In: Paar, C., Koç, Ç.K. (eds.) CHES 2000. LNCS, vol. 1965, pp. 238–252. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Messerges, T., Dabbish, E., Sloan, R.: Investigation of power analysis attacks on smartcards. In: Usenix Workshop on Smartcard Technology (1999), http://www.usenix.org
Liu, P.-C., Chang, H.-C., Lee, C.-Y.: Low Overhead DPA Countermeasure Circuit Based on Ring Oscillators. IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems 57(7), 546–550
Danis, A.U., Berna, O.: Differential Power Analysis Attack Considering Decoupling Capacitance Effect. In: European Conference on Circuit Theory and Design, ECCTD 2009, pp. 358–362 (October 2009)
Semenov, O., Vassighi, A., Sachdev, M., Ali, K., Hawkins, C.F.: Burn-in Temperature Projections for Deep Sub-micron Technologies. In: Proceedings of International Test Conference, ITC 2003, pp. 95–104 (2003)
Pramstaller, N., Oswald, E., Mangard, S., Gürkaynak, F.K., Häne, S.: A masked AES ASIC implementation. In: Proc. Austrochip, pp. 77–82 (2004)
Akkar, M.-L., Giraud, C.: An implementation of DES and AES, secure against some attacks. In: Proc. CHES 2001, pp. 309–318 (2001)
Trichina, E., Seta, D.D., Germani, L.: Simplified adaptive multiplicative masking for AES. In: Proc. CHES 2002, pp. 71–85 (2002)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Choudhury, A.J., Park, B.S., Bruce, N., Lee, Y.S., Lim, H., Lee, H.J. (2011). An Efficient Hardware Countermeasure against Differential Power Analysis Attack. In: Lee, G., Howard, D., Ślęzak, D. (eds) Convergence and Hybrid Information Technology. ICHIT 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 206. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24106-2_20
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24106-2_20
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24105-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24106-2
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)