Abstract
Recently, there have been many studies on constructing cryptographic primitives that are secure even if some secret information leaks. In this paper, we consider the problem of constructing public-key encryption schemes that are resilient to leaking the randomness used in the encryption algorithm. In particular, we consider the case in which public-key encryption schemes are constructed from the KEM/DEM framework, and the leakage of randomness in the encryption algorithms of KEM and DEM occurs independently. For this purpose, we define a new security notion for KEM. Then we provide a generic construction of a public-key encryption scheme that is resilient to randomness leakage from any KEM scheme satisfying this security. Also we construct a KEM scheme that satisfies the security under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
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Namiki, H., Tanaka, K., Yasunaga, K. (2011). Randomness Leakage in the KEM/DEM Framework. In: Boyen, X., Chen, X. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6980. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24315-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24316-5
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