Abstract
We consider a simple network model for economic agents where each can buy commodities in the neighborhood. Their prices may be initially distinct in any node. However, by assuming some rules on new prices, we show that the distinct prices will converge to unique by iterating buy and sell operations. First, we present a protocol model in which each agent always bids an arbitrary price in the difference between his own price and the lowest price in the neighborhood, called max price difference. Next, we derive the condition that price stabilization occurs in our model. Furthermore, we consider game (auction) theoretic price determination by assuming that each agent’s value is uniformly distributed over the max price difference. Finally, we perform a simulation experiment. Our model is suitable for investigating the effects of network topologies on price stabilization.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Beauquier, J., Herault, T., Schiller, E.: Easy Stabilization with an Agent. In: Datta, A.K., Herman, T. (eds.) WSS 2001. LNCS, vol. 2194, pp. 35–50. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Blume, L.E., Easley, D., Kleinberg, J., Tardos, E.: Trading Networks with Price-Setting Agents. Games and Economic Behavior 67, 36–50 (2009)
Challet, D., Marsili, M., Zhang, Y.-C.: Minority Games — Interacting Agents in Financial Markets. Oxford University Press, New York (2005)
Dolev, S., Kat, R.I., Schiller, E.M.: When Consensus Meets Self-stabilization. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 76(8), 884–900 (2010)
Dolev, S., Schiller, E.M., Spirakis, P.G., Tsigas, P.: Strategies for Repeated Games with Subsystem Takeovers Implementable by Deterministic and Self-stabilizing Automata. In: Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Autonomic Computing and Communication Systems (Autonomics 2008), pp. 23–25. ICST, Brussels (2008)
Dolev, S., Schiller, E.M., Welch, J.L.: Random Walk for Self-stabilizing Group Communication in Ad Hoc Networks. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 5(7), 893–905 (2006)
Dasgupta, A., Ghosh, S., Tixeuil, S.: Selfish Stabilization. In: Datta, A.K., Gradinariu, M. (eds.) SSS 2006. LNCS, vol. 4280, pp. 231–243. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Dolev, S.: Self-stabilization. The MIT Press, Cambridge (2000)
Dolev, S., Israeli, A., Moran, S.: Analyzing Expected Time by Scheduler-Luck Games. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 21(5), 429–439 (1995)
Even-Dar, E., Kearns, M., Suri, S.: A Network Formation Game for Bipartite Exchange Economies. In: Proceedings of the 18th ACM-SIAM Simposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2007), pp. 697–706. ACM, SIAM, New York, Philadelphia (2007)
Ghosh, S.: Agents, Distributed Algorithms, and Stabilization. In: Du, D.-Z., Eades, P., Castro, V.E., Lin, X., Sharma, A. (eds.) COCOON 2000. LNCS, vol. 1858, pp. 242–251. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Gouda, M.G., Acharya, H.B.: Nash Equilibria in Stabilizing Systems. In: Guerraoui, R., Petit, F. (eds.) SSS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5873, pp. 311–324. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Herman, T., Masuzawa, T.: Self-stabilizing Agent Traversal. In: Datta, A.K., Herman, T. (eds.) WSS 2001. LNCS, vol. 2194, pp. 152–166. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Kakade, S.M., Kearns, M., Ortiz, L.E., Pemantle, R., Suri, S.: Economic Properties of Social Networks. In: Proceedings of the Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2004), pp. 633–640. The MIT Press, Cambridge (2004)
Kiniwa, J., Kikuta, K.: Analysis of an Intentional Fault Which Is Undetectable by Local Checks under an Unfair Scheduler. In: Guerraoui, R., Petit, F. (eds.) SSS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5873, pp. 443–457. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Kiniwa, J., Kikuta, K.: A Network Model for Price Stabilization. In: Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence (ICAART 2011), pp. 394–397. SciTePress, Portugal (2011)
Krishna, V.: Auction Theory. Academic Press, Orlando (2002)
Lynch, N.A.: Distributed Algorithms. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Francisco (1996)
Myerson, R.B.: Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1991)
Raberto, M., Cincotti, S., Dose, C., Focardi, S.M., Marchesi, M.: Price Formation in an Artificial Market: Limit Order Book Versus Matching of Supply and Demand. In: Thomas, L., Stefan, R., Eleni, S. (eds.) Nonlinear Dynamics and Heterogeneous Interacting Agents. LNEMS, vol. 550, pp. 305–315. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Stiglitz, J.E.: Principles of Micro-economics. W.W.Norton & Company, New York (1993)
Varian, H.R.: Microeconomic Analysis. W.W.Norton & Company, New York (1992)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Kiniwa, J., Kikuta, K. (2011). Price Stabilization in Networks — What Is an Appropriate Model ?. In: Défago, X., Petit, F., Villain, V. (eds) Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems. SSS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6976. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24550-3_22
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24550-3_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24549-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24550-3
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)