Abstract
Deontic logic is the theory of valid inference rules containing qualifications of prohibition, duty, or permission. Three main assumptions of standard deontic-logic approaches are here discussed and rejected: (1) the modal conception of deontic logic, according to which “licit” means “possible without breaking the rules”; (2) the gap between facts and norms, which contends that what actually happens has no bearing on duties; and (3) bivalence, which bars any situation inbetween absolute truth and downright falseness. As against such approaches, we put forward an alternative deontic logic we call soft, which, while being fuzzy (and based on a a paraconsistent gradualistic sentential calculus), binds duties to facts by espousing the implantation principle, according to which, if A is the case, then the duty (or permission) to do B – if – A implies the duty (or permission) to do B. By embracing degrees of licitness our proposal upholds a principle of proportionality ruling out deontic leaps. A formalized axiomatic system along those lines is developed.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ausín, T.: Entre la lógica y el derecho. Paradojas y conflictos normativos. Madrid/México, Plaza y Valdés (2005)
Ausín, T.: Weighing and Gradualism in Leibniz as Instruments for the Analysis of Normative Conflicts. Studia Leibnitiana XXXVII/1, 99–111 (2005)
Ausín, T., Peńa, L.: Arguing from facts to duties (and conversely). In: van Eemeren, F.H., et al. (eds.) Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 45–47. Sic Sat, Amstedam (2003)
Becker, O.: Untersuchungen über den Modalkalkül. Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan (1952)
Bobenrieth, A.: Inconsistencias,¿por qué no? Un estudio filosófico sobre la lógica paraconsistente. Tercer Mundo editores, Colombia (1996)
Broad, C.D.: Imperatives, categorical and hypothetical. The Philosopher 2, 62–75 (1950)
Castañeda, H.-N.: La lógica general de las normas y la ética, vol. 30, pp. 129–196. Universidad de San Carlos, Guatemala (1954)
García Máynez, E.: Los principios de la ontología formal del derecho y su expresión simbólica. México, Imprenta universitaria (1953)
Haack, S.: Filosofía de las lógicas. Madrid, Cátedra, (1978, 1982)
Hansson, S.O.: Deontic Logic without Misleading Alethic Analogies, Logique et Analyse, pp. 123–124, 337–370 (1988)
Hintikka, J.: Some Main Problems of Deontic Logic. In: Hilpinen, R. (ed.) Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, pp. 59–104. D. Reidel, Dordrecht (1971)
Innala, H.-P.: On the non-neutrality of deontic logic. Logique et Analyse, 171–172, 393–410 (2000)
Jackson, F., Robert Pargetter, R.: Oughts, Options, and Actualism. Philosophical Review 95, 233–255 (1986)
Kalinowski, G.: Théorie des propositions normatives. Studia Logica 1, 147–182 (1953)
Leibniz, G.W.: Elementa Juris Naturalis. Madrid, Tecnos (1671, 1991)
Maly, E.: Grundgesetze des Sollens. Elemente der Logik des Willens. Reidel, Dordrecht (1926, 1971)
Mazzarese, T.: Forme di razionalitá delle decisioni giudiziali. In: Torino, G.G, ed. (1996)
Peña, L.: A Chain of Fuzzy Strenghtenings of Entailment Logic. In: Barro, S., Sobrino, A. (eds.) III Congreso Español de Tecnologías y Lógica Fuzzy,Santiago de Compostela, Universidad de Santiago, pp. 115–122 (1993)
Peña, L., Txetxu (eds.): Los derechos positivos. Las demandas justas de acciones y prestaciones. Madrid/México, Plaza y Valdés/CSIC (2006)
Miró Quesada, F.: Paraconsistent Logic: Some Philosophical Issues. In: Priest, G., Routley, R., Norman, J. (eds.) Paraconsistent Logic. Essays on the Inconsistent, pp. 627–652. Philosophia Verlag, Munich (1989)
Sánchez-Mazas, M.: Cálculo de las normas, Barcelona, Ariel (1973)
Schotch, P.K., Jennings, R.E.: Non-kripkean Deontic Logic. In: Hilpinen, R. (ed.) New Studies in Deontic Logic, pp. 149–162. D. Reidel, Dordrecht (1981)
Van Eck, J.A.: A System of Temporally Relative Modal and Deontic Predicate Logic and Its Philosophical Applications 1. Logique et Analyse 99, 249–290 (1982)
Weinberger, O.: The Logic of Norms Founded on Descriptive Language. Ratio Juris 3, 284–307 (1991)
von Wright, G.H.: Deontic Logic. Mind 60, 1–15 (1951)
von Wright, G.H.: On conditional obligations. Särtryck ur Juridisk Tidskrift 1, 1–7 (1994, 1995)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ausín, T., Peña, L. (2012). Soft Deontic Logic. In: Seising, R., Sanz González, V. (eds) Soft Computing in Humanities and Social Sciences. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 273. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24672-2_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24672-2_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24671-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24672-2
eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)