Abstract
Weakly-acyclic games – a superclass of potential games – capture distributed environments where simple, globally-asynchronous interactions between strategic agents are guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. We explore the class of routing games in [4, 12], which models important aspects of routing on the Internet. We show that, in interesting contexts, such routing games are weakly acyclic and, moreover, that pure Nash equilibria in such games can be found in a computationally efficient manner.
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Engelberg, R., Schapira, M. (2011). Weakly-Acyclic (Internet) Routing Games. In: Persiano, G. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6982. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_26
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_26
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