Abstract
It is well known that classical computationally-secure cryptosystems may be susceptible to quantum attacks, i.e., attacks by adversaries able to process quantum information. A prominent example is the RSA public key cryptosystem, whose security is based on the hardness of factoring; it can be broken using a quantum computer running Shor’s efficient factoring algorithm. In this extended abstract, we review an argument which shows that a similar problem can arise even if a cryptosystem provides information-theoretic security. As long as its security analysis is carried out within classical information theory, attacks by quantum adversaries cannot in general be excluded.
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Renner, R. (2012). Information Security in a Quantum World. In: Kotásek, Z., Bouda, J., Černá, I., Sekanina, L., Vojnar, T., Antoš, D. (eds) Mathematical and Engineering Methods in Computer Science. MEMICS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7119. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25929-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25929-6_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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