Abstract
Market demand is affected by quality level and price, in the case of symmetric information. This article establishes the Stackelberg game model when the supplier and the distributor change the order of decision-making. In the situation of Symmetrical information, the supplier and the distributor who has priority decision-making will grab the profits of the other side. This article also studies buy back contracts based on quality effort contract, and establishes the model, analyzes the efforts of supply chain when the information of supplier quality cost is hidden. In the situation of the information of supplier quality cost is hidden, the distributor raises the complex contracts which composes by the high level of quality effect contract and the low level of quality effect contract. The supplier will choose the contract that maximizes its profit. Then the purpose of transferring information is achieved.
This work is supported by the Social Sciences Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (No. 09YJC630201) and humanities and social sciences of Provincial Colleges and Universities in Zhejiang(enterprise management science of Zhejiang Gongshang University).
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© 2012 Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg
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Di, X., Wei, D., Yun-hong, H. (2012). Buy Back Contract Based on Quality Effort in Supply Chain. In: Sambath, S., Zhu, E. (eds) Frontiers in Computer Education. Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, vol 133. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27552-4_46
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27552-4_46
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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