Abstract
We observe a security issue in protocols for session key exchange that are based on Strong Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). The problem is illustrated by cryptanalyzing a recent scheme of Tuyls and Skoric [1], which has been proposed for use in a bank card scenario. Under realistic assumptions, for example that the adversary Eve can eavesdrop the communication between the players and gains physical access to the PUF twice, she can derive previous session keys in this scheme. The observed problem seems to require the introduction of a new PUF variant, so-called “Erasable PUFs”. Having defined this new primitive, we execute some first steps towards its practical implementation, and argue that Erasable PUFs could be implemented securely via ALILE-based crossbar structures.
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Rührmair, U., Jaeger, C., Algasinger, M. (2012). An Attack on PUF-Based Session Key Exchange and a Hardware-Based Countermeasure: Erasable PUFs. In: Danezis, G. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7035. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27576-0_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27576-0_16
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