Abstract
The success postulate of classic belief revision theory demands that after revising some beliefs with by information the new information is believed. However, this form of prioritized belief revision is not apt under many circumstances. Research in non-prioritized belief revision investigates forms of belief revision where success is not a desirable property. Herein, selective revision uses a two step approach, first applying a transformation function to decide if and which part of the new information shall be accepted, and second, incorporating the result using a prioritized revision operator. In this paper, we implement a transformation function by employing deductive argumentation to assess the value of new information. Hereby we obtain a non-prioritized revision operator that only accepts new information if believing in the information is justifiable with respect to the beliefs. By making use of previous results on selective revision we prove that our revision operator satisfies several desirable properties. We illustrate the use of the revision operator by means of examples and compare it with related work.
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Krümpelmann, P., Thimm, M., Falappa, M.A., García, A.J., Kern-Isberner, G., Simari, G.R. (2012). Selective Revision by Deductive Argumentation. In: Modgil, S., Oren, N., Toni, F. (eds) Theorie and Applications of Formal Argumentation. TAFA 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7132. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29184-5_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29184-5_10
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