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Honesty in Budgetary Reporting - an Experimental Study

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Operations Research Proceedings 2011

Part of the book series: Operations Research Proceedings ((ORP))

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Abstract

In the experiment we investigate how an agent’s participation in the budgetary process influences his willingness to truthful communication of private information, if there are financial incentives to misrepresentation. The paper focuses on the trade-off between the agent’s preferences for wealth and honesty. The objective is to find and examine the relation between social preferences and honesty in managerial reporting.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Universitätsstraße 15, A-8010, Graz, Austria

    Arleta Mietek & Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger

Authors
  1. Arleta Mietek
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  2. Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Arleta Mietek .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für, Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Universität Zürich, Moussonstrasse, Zurich, 8044, Switzerland

    Diethard Klatte

  2. Inst. Operations Research, ETH Zürich, Rämistr. 101, Zürich, 8092, Switzerland

    Hans-Jakob Lüthi

  3. Institut für, Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Universität Zürich, Moussonstrasse 15, Zurich, 8044, Switzerland

    Karl Schmedders

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Mietek, A., Leopold-Wildburger, U. (2012). Honesty in Budgetary Reporting - an Experimental Study. In: Klatte, D., Lüthi, HJ., Schmedders, K. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2011. Operations Research Proceedings. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_33

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