Abstract
This paper is a contribution to dynamic doxastic logic (DDL), that is, doxastic logic supplemented with operators for belief change due to new information. Thus in addition to operators for belief (B) and doxastic commitment (K) we also have, for each pure Boolean formula φ, a propositional operator [ ∗ φ] with the informal reading “after the agent has come to believe that φ and revised his beliefs accordingly it is the case that”. The resulting new logical landscape turns out to be overwhelmingly rich. An important question—and the topic of this paper—is how to deal with this richness.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Alchourrón, C., Gärdenfors, P., Makinson, D.: On the logic of theory change. The Journal of Symbolic Logic 50, 510–530 (1985)
Grahne, G.: Updates and counterfactuals. Journal of Logic and Computation 8(1), 87–117 (1998)
Grove, A.: Two modellings for theory change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 17, 157–170 (1988)
Katsuno, H., Mendelzon, A.O.: On the difference between updating a knowledge base and revising it. In: Gärdenfors, P. (ed.) Belief Revision, pp. 183–203. Cambridge University Press (1992)
Leitgeb, H., Segerberg, K.: Doxastic dynamic logic: Why, whether, how. Synthese: Knowledge, Rationality and Action 155(2), 167–190 (2007)
Levesque, H.: All I know: A study in autoepistemic logic. Artificial Intelligence 42, 263–309 (1990)
Lewis, D.K.: Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1973)
Lindström, S., Rabinowicz, W.: Epistemic Entrenchment with Incomparabilities and Relational Belief Revision. In: Fuhrmann, A., Morreau, M. (eds.) The Logic of Theory Change. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 465, pp. 93–126. Springer, Heidelberg (1991)
Lindström, S., Rabinowicz, W.: DDL unlimited: Dynamic doxastic logic for introspective agents. Erkenntnis 50(2-3), 353–385 (1999)
Lindström, S., Segerberg, K.: Modal logic and philosophy. In: Blackburn, P., van Benthem, J., Wolter, F. (eds.) Handbook of Modal Logic, pp. 1149–1214. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2007)
Rott, H.: Shifting priorities: Simple representations for twenty-seven iterated theory change operators. In: Lagerlund, H., Lindström, S., Sliwiński, R. (eds.) Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg. Uppsala Philosophical Studies, vol. 53, pp. 359–384. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala (2006)
Segerberg, K.: The basic dynamic doxastic logic of AGM. In: Williams, M.-A., Rott, H. (eds.) Frontiers in Belief Revision. Applied Logic Series, vol. 22, pp. 57–84. Kluwer, Dordrecht (2001)
Segerberg, K.: Iterated belief revision in dynamic doxastic logic. In: Gupta, A., Parikh, R., van Benthem, J. (eds.) Logic at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary View, vol. 1, pp. 331–343. Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi (2007)
Segerberg, K.: Some completeness theorems in the dynamic doxastic logic of iterated belief revision. Review of Symbolic Logic 3(2), 228–246 (2010)
van Benthem, J.F.A.K.: Dynamic logic of belief revision. Journal of Applied Non-classical Logics 17, 129–155 (2007)
Zvesper, J.: A revised version: Belief revision and epistemic acts. Tech. rep., M.Sc. thesis, ILLC, University of Amsterdam (2007)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Segerberg, K. (2012). Strategies for Belief Revision. In: van Eijck, J., Verbrugge, R. (eds) Games, Actions and Social Software. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7010. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29326-9_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29326-9_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29325-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29326-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)