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Diffie-Hellman without Difficulty

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Formal Aspects of Security and Trust (FAST 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7140))

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Abstract

An excellent way for a protocol to obtain shared keys is Diffie-Hellman. For the automated verification of security protocols, the use of Diffie-Hellman poses a certain amount of difficulty, because it requires algebraic reasoning. Several tools work in the free algebra and even for tools that do support Diffie-Hellman, the algebraic reasoning becomes a bottleneck.

We provide a new relative-soundness result: for a large class of protocols, significantly restricting the abilities of the intruder is without loss of attacks. We also show the soundness of a very restrictive encoding of Diffie-Hellman proposed by Millen and how to obtain a problem that can be answered in the free algebra without increasing its size upon encoding. This enables the efficient use of free-algebra verification tools for Diffie-Hellman based protocols and significantly reduces search-spaces for tools that do support algebraic reasoning.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. DTU Informatics, Denmark

    Sebastian Mödersheim

Authors
  1. Sebastian Mödersheim
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. IMDEA Software Institute, Universidad Politecnica de Madrid, Campus Montegancedo, 28660, Boadilla del Monte, Madrid, Spain

    Gilles Barthe

  2. Carnegie Mellon University, NASA Research Park, Bldg. 23 (MS 23-11), P.O. Box 1, 94035-0001, Moffet Field, CA, USA

    Anupam Datta

  3. Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science, Embedded Systems Security Group, Technical University of Eindhoven, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

    Sandro Etalle

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Mödersheim, S. (2012). Diffie-Hellman without Difficulty. In: Barthe, G., Datta, A., Etalle, S. (eds) Formal Aspects of Security and Trust. FAST 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7140. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29420-4_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29420-4_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29419-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29420-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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