Abstract
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical stable marriage problem, both men and women express a strict preference order over the members of the other sex, in a qualitative way. Here we consider stable marriage problems with weighted preferences: each man (resp., woman) provides a score for each woman (resp., man). Such problems are more expressive than the classical stable marriage problems. Moreover, in some real-life situations it is more natural to express scores (to model, for example, profits or costs) rather than a qualitative preference ordering. In this context, we define new notions of stability and optimality, and we provide algorithms to find marriages which are stable and/or optimal according to these notions. While expressivity greatly increases by adopting weighted preferences, we show that in most cases the desired solutions can be found by adapting existing algorithms for the classical stable marriage problem. We also investigate manipulation issues in our framework. More precisely, we adapt the classical notion of manipulation to our context and we study if the procedures which return the new kinds of stable marriages are manipulable.
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Pini, M.S., Rossi, F., Venable, K.B., Walsh, T. (2013). Stability and Optimality in Matching Problems with Weighted Preferences. In: Filipe, J., Fred, A. (eds) Agents and Artificial Intelligence. ICAART 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 271. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29966-7_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29966-7_21
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