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Android Security Permissions – Can We Trust Them?

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Security and Privacy in Mobile Information and Communication Systems (MobiSec 2011)

Abstract

The popularity of the Android System in combination with the lax market approval process may attract the injection of malicious applications (apps) into the market. Android features a permission system allowing a user to review the permissions an app requests and grant or deny access to resources prior to installation. This system conveys a level of trust due to the fact that an app only has access to resources granted by the stated permissions. Thereby, not only the meaning of single permissions, but especially their combination plays an important role for understanding the possible implications. In this paper we present a method that circumvents the permission system by spreading permissions over two or more apps that communicate with each other via arbitrary communication channels. We discuss relevant details of the Android system, describe the permission spreading process, possible implications and countermeasures. Furthermore, we present three apps that demonstrate the problem and a possible detection method.

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© 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Orthacker, C. et al. (2012). Android Security Permissions – Can We Trust Them?. In: Prasad, R., Farkas, K., Schmidt, A.U., Lioy, A., Russello, G., Luccio, F.L. (eds) Security and Privacy in Mobile Information and Communication Systems. MobiSec 2011. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 94. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30244-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30244-2_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30243-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30244-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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