Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Selfish Random Access: Equilibrium Conditions and Best-Response Learning

  • Conference paper
Game Theory for Networks (GameNets 2011)

Included in the following conference series:

  • 1479 Accesses

Abstract

This paper studies a class of random access games for wireless channels with multipacket reception. First, necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions for a contention strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium for general wireless channels are established. Then, applications of these equilibrium conditions for well-known channel models are illustrated. Various engineering insights and design ideas are provided. Finally, the results are extended to an incomplete information game setting, and best-response learning dynamics leading to Nash equilibria are investigated.

This research was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grant CNS-09-05086, and by the Australian Research Council under Grant DP-11-0102729.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Lee, J.-W., Tang, A., Huang, J., Chiang, M., Calderbank, A.R.: Reverse-engineering MAC: A Non-cooperative Game Model. IEEE J. Sel. Area Commun. 25, 1135–1147 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Cui, T., Chen, L., Low, S.H.: A Game-theoretic Framework for Medium Access Control. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 26, 1116–1127 (2008)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Chen, L., Low, S.H., Doyle, J.C.: Random Access Game and Medium Access Control Design. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 18, 1303–1316 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. MacKenzie, A.B., Wicker, S.B.: Selfish Users in Aloha: A Game-theoretic Approach. In: IEEE Vehicular Technology Conf., Atlantic City, NJ, pp. 1354–1357 (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Inaltekin, H., Wicker, S.B.: The Analysis of Nash Equilibria of the One-shot Random Access Game for Wireless Networks and the Behavior of Selfish Nodes. IEEE/ACM Trans. on Netw. 16, 1094–1107 (2008)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Jin, Y., Kesidis, G.: Equilibria of a Noncooperative Game for Heterogenous Users of an ALOHA Network. IEEE Commun. Lett. 6, 282–284 (2002)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. MacKenzie, A.B., Wicker, S.B.: Stability of Multipacket Slotted Aloha with Selfish Users and Perfect Information. In: 22nd Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, San Francisco, CA, pp. 1583-1590 (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Ngo, M.H., Krishnamurthy, V.: Game Theoretic Cross-layer Transmission Policies in Multipacket Reception Wireless Networks. IEEE Trans. Signal Process. 55, 1911–1926 (2007)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  9. Glicksberg, I.L.: A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points. Proc. American Mathematical Society 3, 170–174 (1952)

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.: Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge (1991)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  11. Mahravari, N.: Random-access Communication with Multiple Reception. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 36, 614–622 (1990)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  12. Tsybakov, B.S., Mikhailov, V.A., Likhanov, N.B.: Bounds for Packet Transmission Rate in a Random Access System. Problemy Peredachi Informatsii 19, 61–81 (1983)

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  13. Mathys, P.: A Class of Codes for a T Active Users out of N Multiple-access Communication System. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 36, 1206–1219 (1990)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Kellogg, R.B.: Uniqueness in the Schauder Fixed Point Theorem. Proc. American Mathematical Society 60, 207–210 (1976)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Inaltekin, H., Wicker, S.B.: Random Access Games: Selfish Nodes with Incomplete Information. In: IEEE Military Communications Conf., Orlando, FL, pp. 1–6 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, 3010, Australia

    Hazer Inaltekin

  2. Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08544, USA

    Mung Chiang & Harold Vincent Poor

Authors
  1. Hazer Inaltekin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Mung Chiang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Harold Vincent Poor
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. USC, 90089-2562, Los Angeles, CA, USA

    Rahul Jain

  2. Louisiana State University, 70803, Baton Rouge, LA, USA

    Rajgopal Kannan

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

About this paper

Cite this paper

Inaltekin, H., Chiang, M., Poor, H.V. (2012). Selfish Random Access: Equilibrium Conditions and Best-Response Learning. In: Jain, R., Kannan, R. (eds) Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2011. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 75. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30372-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30373-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation