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# Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications

Second International ICST Conference  
AMMA 2011  
New York, NY, USA, August 22–23, 2011  
Revised Selected Papers

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# Preface

The second edition of the biennial Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (AMMA) was held in August 2011 in New York City, following on the success of the first edition, held in Boston in 2009.

AMMA is a forum for advances in the theory and practice of auctions and market mechanisms. The goal of the conference is to bring together researchers from computer science, economics, and business schools as well as industry, with common interests in issues that arise in all stages of deploying market mechanisms. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conference also focuses on experiences from the real world such as case studies and new applications. This year, the technical program featured 22 papers and case studies by computer scientists and economists on topics such as school choice, markets for housing, energy, and advertising, prediction markets, and the theory of market design.

The conference also featured two invited talks on market design in both the public and private sectors. Peter Cramton of the University of Maryland presented “Medicare Auctions: A Case Study of Government Market Design,” discussing the design of an auction for medical equipment procurement for Medicare. Jeremy A. Smith of SecondMarket, Inc., presented “Dutch Auction. English Auction. Manhattan Auction?”, discussing auctions for esoteric assets.

AMMA offers both archival and non-archival tracks to accommodate the publishing traditions of different disciplines. These proceedings contain the full papers accepted to the archival track, as well as the abstracts of papers presented in the non-archival track. For full versions of non-archival papers, please contact the authors or visit their websites.

October 2011

Peter Coles  
Sanmay Das  
Sébastien Lahaie  
Boleslaw Szymanski

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