Skip to main content

The Inverse Shapley Value Problem

  • Conference paper
Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 7391))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 2172 Accesses

Abstract

For f a weighted voting scheme used by n voters to choose between two candidates, the n Shapley-Shubik Indices (or Shapley values) of f provide a measure of how much control each voter can exert over the overall outcome of the vote. Shapley-Shubik indices were introduced by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 1954 [SS54] and are widely studied in social choice theory as a measure of the “influence” of voters. The Inverse Shapley Value Problem is the problem of designing a weighted voting scheme which (approximately) achieves a desired input vector of values for the Shapley-Shubik indices. Despite much interest in this problem no provably correct and efficient algorithm was known prior to our work.

We give the first efficient algorithm with provable performance guarantees for the Inverse Shapley Value Problem. For any constant ε > 0 our algorithm runs in fixed poly(n) time (the degree of the polynomial is independent of ε) and has the following performance guarantee: given as input a vector of desired Shapley values, if any “reasonable” weighted voting scheme (roughly, one in which the threshold is not too skewed) approximately matches the desired vector of values to within some small error, then our algorithm explicitly outputs a weighted voting scheme that achieves this vector of Shapley values to within error ε. If there is a “reasonable” voting scheme in which all voting weights are integers at most poly(n) that approximately achieves the desired Shapley values, then our algorithm runs in time poly(n) and outputs a weighted voting scheme that achieves the target vector of Shapley values to within error ε = n − 1/8.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Aziz, H., Paterson, M., Leech, D.: Efficient algorithm for designing weighted voting games. In: IEEE Intl. Multitopic Conf., pp. 1–6 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Banzhaf, J.: Weighted voting doesn’t work: A mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Review 19, 317–343 (1965)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Benjamini, I., Kalai, G., Schramm, O.: Noise sensitivity of Boolean functions and applications to percolation. Inst. Hautes Études Sci. Publ. Math. 90, 5–43 (1999)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Bachrach, Y., Markakis, E., Resnick, E., Procaccia, A., Rosenschein, J., Saberi, A.: Approximating power indices: theoretical and empirical analysis. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 20(2), 105–122 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Chow, C.K.: On the characterization of threshold functions. In: Proc. 2nd FOCS 1961, pp. 34–38 (1961)

    Google Scholar 

  6. De, A., Diakonikolas, I., Feldman, V., Servedio, R.: Near-optimal solutions for the Chow Parameters Problem and low-weight approximation of halfspaces. To appear in STOC (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  7. de Keijzer, B.: A survey on the computation of power indices (2008), http://www.st.ewi.tudelft.nl/~tomas/theses/DeKeijzerSurvey.pdf

  8. de Keijzer, B., Klos, T., Zhang, Y.: Enumeration and exact design of weighted voting games. In: AAMAS 2010, pp. 391–398 (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Deegan, J., Packel, E.: A new index of power for simple n-person games. International Journal of Game Theory 7, 113–123 (1978)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. Elkind, E., Goldberg, L.A., Goldberg, P.W., Wooldridge, M.: Computational complexity of weighted voting games. In: AAAI 2007, pp. 718–723 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Fatima, S., Wooldridge, M., Jennings, N.: An Anytime Approximation Method for the Inverse Shapley Value Problem. In: AAMAS 2008, pp. 935–942 (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Goldberg, P.: A Bound on the Precision Required to Estimate a Boolean Perceptron from its Average Satisfying Assignment. SIDMA 20, 328–343 (2006)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  13. Holler, M.J.: Forming coalitions and measuring voting power. Political Studies 30, 262–271 (1982)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Impagliazzo, R.: Hard-core distributions for somewhat hard problems. In: Proc. 36th FOCS 1995, pp. 538–545 (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Kalai, G., Safra, S.: Threshold phenomena and influence. In: Computational Complexity and Statistical Physics, pp. 25–60. Oxford University Press (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Kurz, S.: On the inverse power index problem. Optimization (2011), doi:10.1080/02331934.2011.587008

    Google Scholar 

  17. Leech, D.: Computing power indices for large voting games. Management Science 49(6) (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Muroga, S., Toda, I., Takasu, S.: Theory of majority switching elements. J. Franklin Institute 271, 376–418 (1961)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  19. O’Donnell, R., Servedio, R.: The Chow Parameters Problem. In: Proc. 40th STOC 2008, pp. 517–526 (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Owen, G.: Multilinear extensions of games. Management Science 18(5), 64–79 (1972); Part 2, Game theory and Gaming

    Google Scholar 

  21. Roth, A.E. (ed.): The Shapley value. University of Cambridge Press (1988)

    Google Scholar 

  22. Shapley, L., Shubik, M.: A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System. American Political Science Review 48, 787–792 (1954)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Trevisan, L., Tulsiani, M., Vadhan, S.: Regularity, Boosting and Efficiently Simulating every High Entropy Distribution. Technical Report 103, ECCC, 2008. Conference version in Proc. CCC (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  24. Zuckerman, M., Faliszewski, P., Bachrach, Y., Elkind, E.: Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games. In: AAAI, pp. 215–220 (2008)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

De, A., Diakonikolas, I., Servedio, R. (2012). The Inverse Shapley Value Problem. In: Czumaj, A., Mehlhorn, K., Pitts, A., Wattenhofer, R. (eds) Automata, Languages, and Programming. ICALP 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7391. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31594-7_23

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31594-7_23

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31593-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-31594-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics