Abstract
The detection of covert channels in an information flow model is a practical problem in determining whether the security guarantees of the operation system have been achieved. Asbestos system is a typical information confidentiality protection system. This poster introduces a formal approach to automatically detect covert channels in Asbestos systems. The approach innovatively generalizes a CSP (Communicating Sequential Process) based formal description of Asbestos system and utilizes Ray’s noninterference Equivalence in the detection of covert channels. The covert channels are automatically detected by employing a CSP based model checking tool FDR2.
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Efstathopoulos, P., Krohn, M., VanDeBogart, S., Frey, C., Ziegler, D., Kohler, E., Mazieres, D., Kaashoek, F., Robert, M.: Labels and event processes in the asbestos operating system. In: Proc. of the 20th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (2005)
Ryan, P.A., Schneider, S.A.: Process algebra and noninterference. Journal of Computer Security 9(1-2), 75–103 (2001)
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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Jin, S., Yang, Z., Cui, X. (2012). Automatic Covert Channel Detection in Asbestos System (Poster Abstract). In: Balzarotti, D., Stolfo, S.J., Cova, M. (eds) Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses. RAID 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7462. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33338-5_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33338-5_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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