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Leakage Squeezing of Order Two

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Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2012 (INDOCRYPT 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7668))

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Abstract

In masking schemes, leakage squeezing is the study of the optimal shares’ representation, that maximizes the resistance order against high-order side-channel attacks. Squeezing the leakage of first-order Boolean masking has been problematized and solved previously in [8]. The solution consists in finding a bijection F that modifies the mask, in such a way that its graph, seen as a code, be of greatest dual distance. This paper studies second-order leakage squeezing, i.e. leakage squeezing with two independent random masks. It is proved that, compared to first-order leakage squeezing, second-order leakage squeezing at least increments (by one unit) the resistance against high-order attacks, such as high-order correlation power analyses (HO-CPA). Now, better improvements over first-order leakage squeezing are possible by relevant constructions of squeezing bijections. We provide with linear bijections that improve by strictly more than one (instead of one) the resistance order. Specifically, when the masking is applied on bytes (which suits AES), resistance against 1st-order (resp. 2nd-order) attacks is possible with one (resp. two) masks. Optimal leakage squeezing with one mask resists HO-CPA of orders up to 5. In this paper, with two masks, we provide resistance against HO-CPA not only of order 5 + 1 = 6, but also of order 7.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. LAGA, UMR 7539, CNRS, Department of Mathematics, University of Paris XIII and University of Paris VIII, 2 rue de la liberté, 93 526, Saint-Denis Cedex, France

    Claude Carlet

  2. TELECOM-ParisTech, Crypto Group, 37/39 rue Dareau, 75 634, Paris Cedex 13, France

    Jean-Luc Danger, Sylvain Guilley & Houssem Maghrebi

  3. Secure-IC S.A.S., 80 avenue des Buttes de Coësmes, 35 700, Rennes, France

    Jean-Luc Danger & Sylvain Guilley

Authors
  1. Claude Carlet
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  2. Jean-Luc Danger
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  3. Sylvain Guilley
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  4. Houssem Maghrebi
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, 1142, Auckland, New Zealand

    Steven Galbraith

  2. Indian Statistical Institute, Applied Statistics Unit, 203 B.T. Road, 700108, Kolkata, West Bengal, India

    Mridul Nandi

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Carlet, C., Danger, JL., Guilley, S., Maghrebi, H. (2012). Leakage Squeezing of Order Two. In: Galbraith, S., Nandi, M. (eds) Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2012. INDOCRYPT 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7668. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34931-7_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34931-7_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-34930-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-34931-7

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