Abstract
We present a Stamp&Extend time-stamping scheme based on linking via modified creation of Schnorr signatures. The scheme is based on lazy construction of a tree of signatures.
Stamp&Extend returns a timestamp immediately after the request, unlike the schemes based on the concept of timestamping rounds. Despite the fact that all timestamps are linearly linked, verification of a timestamp requires a logarithmic number of steps with respect to the chain length. An extra feature of the scheme is that any attempt to forge a timestamp by the Time Stamping Authority (TSA) results in revealing its secret key, providing an undeniable cryptographic evidence of misbehavior of TSA.
Breaking Stamp&Extend requires not only breaking Schnorr signatures, but to some extend also breaking Pedersen commitments.
The paper is partially supported by Foundation for Polish Science, MISTRZ project.
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Krzywiecki, Ł., Kubiak, P., Kutyłowski, M. (2012). Stamp and Extend – Instant But Undeniable Timestamping Based on Lazy Trees. In: Mitchell, C.J., Tomlinson, A. (eds) Trusted Systems. INTRUST 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7711. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35371-0_2
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