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A Method Based on Congestion Game Theory for Determining Electoral Tendencies

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Social Informatics (SocInfo 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 7710))

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Abstract

We present a novel method to study the tendencies of vote in sectorial democratic elections. Our method is intended to determine the relevant profiles characterizing the political behavior of voters. Those profiles allow us to model how the voters, in a specific election organized by sectors, make their vote decision. Furthermore, the same set of profiles are used for representing the different strategies applied by the candidates that compete in the election.

We apply congestion games theory to simulate the distribution of the votes among the candidates, describing an automated way to estimate the likely number of votes for each candidate. Therefore, we can determine who will be the winner candidate of the election, according to a specific political scenario. We report the application of our model to simulate the elections of a director in a university setting, obtaining estimations very close to the actual outcomes.

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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De Ita, G., Altamirano, L., López-López, A., Moyao, Y. (2012). A Method Based on Congestion Game Theory for Determining Electoral Tendencies. In: Aberer, K., Flache, A., Jager, W., Liu, L., Tang, J., Guéret, C. (eds) Social Informatics. SocInfo 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7710. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35386-4_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35386-4_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35385-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35386-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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