Abstract
We present a novel method to study the tendencies of vote in sectorial democratic elections. Our method is intended to determine the relevant profiles characterizing the political behavior of voters. Those profiles allow us to model how the voters, in a specific election organized by sectors, make their vote decision. Furthermore, the same set of profiles are used for representing the different strategies applied by the candidates that compete in the election.
We apply congestion games theory to simulate the distribution of the votes among the candidates, describing an automated way to estimate the likely number of votes for each candidate. Therefore, we can determine who will be the winner candidate of the election, according to a specific political scenario. We report the application of our model to simulate the elections of a director in a university setting, obtaining estimations very close to the actual outcomes.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Banks, J., Duggan, J.: A dynamic model of democratic elections in multidimensional policy spaces. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3, 269–299 (2008)
De Ita, G., Moyao, Y., Contreras, M.: Modeling Democratic Elections via Congestion Networks. In: First Int. Conf. on Social Eco-Informatics, vol. 1, pp. 85–90 (2011)
Feldmann, A.E., Röglin, H., Vöcking, B.: Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games. In: Shvartsman, A.A., Felber, P. (eds.) SIROCCO 2008. LNCS, vol. 5058, pp. 209–220. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Gill, J., Gainous, J.: Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation. Statistical Science 17, 1–22 (2002)
Jackson, M., Moselle, B.: Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game. Journal of Economic Theory 103(1), 49–87 (2002)
Morales, P.: Evaluación de los valores: análisis de listas de ordenamiento, CTAN (2011), http://www.upcomillas.es/personal/peter/otrosdocumentos/ValoresMetodo.pdf
Morales, P.: Cuestionarios y Escalas, Universidad Pontificia Comillas, CTAN (2011), http://www.upcomillas.es/personal/peter/otrosdocumentos/CuestionariosyEscalas.doc
Pajares, F.M.: Teachers’ Beliefs and Educational Research: Cleaning up a Messy Construct. Review of Educational Research 16, 307–332 (1992)
Quant, M., Borm, P., Reijnierse, H.: Congestion network problems and related games. European Journal of Operational Research 172, 919–930 (2006)
Quinn, K.M., Martin, D.: An Integrated Computational Model of Multiparty Electoral Competition. Statistical Science 17(4), 405–419 (2002)
Strom, K.: A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Parties. American Journal of Political Science 34, 565–598 (1990)
Kim, S., Taber, Ch.S., Lodge, M.: A Computational Model of the Citizen as Motivated Reasoner: Modeling the Dynamics of the 2000 Presidential Election. Polit Behav. 32, 1–28 (2010)
Fabrikant, A., Papadimitriou, Ch.S., Talwar, K.: The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria. In: Procs. STOC 2004, Chicago, Illinois, USA, June 13-15, pp. 604–612 (2004)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
De Ita, G., Altamirano, L., López-López, A., Moyao, Y. (2012). A Method Based on Congestion Game Theory for Determining Electoral Tendencies. In: Aberer, K., Flache, A., Jager, W., Liu, L., Tang, J., Guéret, C. (eds) Social Informatics. SocInfo 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7710. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35386-4_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35386-4_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35385-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35386-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)