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A Related-Key Attack against Multiple Encryption Based on Fixed Points

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E-Business and Telecommunications (ICETE 2011)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 314))

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Abstract

In order to alleviate the burden of short keys, encrypting a multiple times has been proposed. In the multiple encryption mode, there may be encryptions under the same or different keys. There have been several attacks against this encryption mode. When triple encryption is based on two keys, for instance, Merkle and Hellman proposed a subtle meet-in-the-middle attack with a complexity similar to breaking a single encryption, requiring nearly all the codebook. In the case of triple encryption with three keys, Kelsey, Schneier, and Wagner proposed a related-key attack with complexity similar to breaking a single encryption.

In this paper, we propose a new related-key attack against triple encryption which compares to breaking single encryption in the two aforementioned cases. Based on finding fixed points in a decrypt-encrypt sequence, we propose a related-key attack against a two-key triple encryption. Our attack has exactly the same performance as a meet-in-the-middle on double encryption. When considering two keys, it is comparable to the Merkle-Hellman attack, except that uses related keys. And, when considering three keys, it has a higher complexity than the Kelsey-Schneier-Wagner attack, but has the advantage that it can live with known plaintexts.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. EPFL, Switzerland

    Aslı Bay, Atefeh Mashatan & Serge Vaudenay

Authors
  1. Aslı Bay
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  2. Atefeh Mashatan
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  3. Serge Vaudenay
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Monmouth University, 07764, West Long Branch, NJ, U.S.A.

    Mohammad S. Obaidat

  2. University of Seville, C/S. Fernando, 4, C.P. 41004, Sevilla, Spain

    José L. Sevillano

  3. Departament of Systems and Informatics, Polytechnic Institute of Setúbal – INSTICC, Rua do Vale de Chaves - Estefanilha, 2910-761, Setúbal, Portugal

    Joaquim Filipe

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Bay, A., Mashatan, A., Vaudenay, S. (2012). A Related-Key Attack against Multiple Encryption Based on Fixed Points. In: Obaidat, M.S., Sevillano, J.L., Filipe, J. (eds) E-Business and Telecommunications. ICETE 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 314. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35755-8_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35755-8_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35754-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35755-8

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