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Attack Interference: A Path to Defending Security Protocols

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E-Business and Telecommunications (ICETE 2011)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 314))

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Abstract

Traditionally security protocol analysis relies on a single Dolev-Yao attacker. This type of attacker is so powerful that overall attack power does not change if additional attackers cooperate. In this paper, we take a fundamentally different approach and investigate the case of multiple non-collaborating attackers. We show how non-collaboration between attackers gives rise to interference between ongoing attacks and that it is possible to actively exploit attack interference to mitigate security breaches and provide partial protection to weak protocols.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Verona, Strada le Grazie 15, Verona, Italy

    Maria-Camilla Fiazza, Michele Peroli & Luca Viganò

Authors
  1. Maria-Camilla Fiazza
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  2. Michele Peroli
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  3. Luca Viganò
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Monmouth University, 07764, West Long Branch, NJ, U.S.A.

    Mohammad S. Obaidat

  2. University of Seville, C/S. Fernando, 4, C.P. 41004, Sevilla, Spain

    José L. Sevillano

  3. Departament of Systems and Informatics, Polytechnic Institute of Setúbal – INSTICC, Rua do Vale de Chaves - Estefanilha, 2910-761, Setúbal, Portugal

    Joaquim Filipe

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Fiazza, MC., Peroli, M., Viganò, L. (2012). Attack Interference: A Path to Defending Security Protocols. In: Obaidat, M.S., Sevillano, J.L., Filipe, J. (eds) E-Business and Telecommunications. ICETE 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 314. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35755-8_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35755-8_21

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35754-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35755-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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