Skip to main content

Using Model-Checking to Reveal a Vulnerability of Tamper-Evident Pairing

  • Conference paper
NASA Formal Methods (NFM 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 7871))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 1375 Accesses

Abstract

Wi-Fi Protected Setup is an attempt to simplify configuration of security settings for Wi-Fi networks. It offers, among other methods, Push-Button Configuration (PBC) for devices with a limited user-interface. There are however some security issues in PBC. A solution to these issues was proposed in the form of Tamper-Evident Pairing (TEP).

TEP is based on the Tamper-Evident Announcement (TEA), in which a device engaging in the key agreement not only sends a payload containing its Diffie-Hellmann public key, but also sends a hash of this payload in a special, trustedly secure manner. The idea is that thanks to the special way in which the hash is sent, the receiver can tell whether or not the hash was altered by an adversary and if necessary reject it.

Several parameters needed for implementation of TEP have been left unspecified by its authors. Verification of TEA using the Spin model-checker has revealed that the value of these parameters is critical for the security of the protocol. The implementation decision can break the resistance of TEP against man-in-the-middle attacks. We give appropriate values for these parameters and show how model-checking was applied to retrieve these values.

This work is part of the IOP GenCom GoGreen project, sponsored by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Armando, A., Basin, D., Boichut, Y., Chevalier, Y., Compagna, L., Cuellar, J., Hankes Drielsma, P., HeĆ”m, P.C., Kouchnarenko, O., Mantovani, J., Mƶdersheim, S., von Oheimb, D., Rusinowitch, M., Santiago, J., Turuani, M., Viganò, L., Vigneron, L.: The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications. In: Etessami, K., Rajamani, S.K. (eds.) CAV 2005. LNCS, vol. 3576, pp. 281–285. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Armando, A., Carbone, R., Compagna, L.: LTL model checking for security protocols. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 19(4), 403–429 (2009)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Bengtsson, J., Larsen, K., Larsson, F., Pettersson, P., Yi, W.: uppaal — a Tool Suite for Automatic Verification of Real–Time Systems. In: Alur, R., Sontag, E.D., Henzinger, T.A. (eds.) HS 1995. LNCS, vol. 1066, pp. 232–243. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Blanchet, B.: An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules. In: 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-14), Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, pp. 82–96. IEEE Computer Society (June 2001)

    Google Scholar 

  5. BoŔnacki, D., Dams, D.: Integrating real time into Spin: a prototype implementation. In: BoŔnacki, D. (ed.) Enhancing State Space Reduction Techniques for Model Checking. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Diffie, W., Hellman, M.: New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 22(6), 644–654 (1976)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  7. Drijvers, M.: Model checking Tamper-Evident Pairing. Bachelor thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Gollakota, S., Ahmed, N., Zeldovich, N., Katabi, D.: Secure in-band wireless pairing. In: Proceedings of the 20th USENIX Conference on Security, SEC 2011. USENIX Association, Berkeley (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Holzmann, G.: The model checker Spin. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 23(5), 279–295 (1997)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  10. Kainda, R., Flechais, I., Roscoe, A.W.: Usability and security of out-of-band channels in secure device pairing protocols. In: Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, pp. 11:1–11:12. ACM, New York (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Kobsa, A., Sonawalla, R., Tsudik, G., Uzun, E., Wang, Y.: Serial hook-ups: a comparative usability study of secure device pairing methods. In: Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, pp. 10:1–10:12. ACM, New York (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Kuo, C., Walker, J., Perrig, A.: Low-cost manufacturing, usability, and security: An analysis of Bluetooth Simple Pairing and Wi-Fi Protected Setup. In: Dietrich, S., Dhamija, R. (eds.) FC 2007 and USEC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4886, pp. 325–340. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Lowe, G.: Towards a completeness result for model checking of security protocols. In: Proceedings of the 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 96–105 (June 1998)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Martin, M., Lam, M.S.: Automatic generation of XSS and SQL injection attacks with goal-directed model checking. In: Proceedings of the 17th Conference on Security Symposium, SS 2008, pp. 31–43. USENIX Association (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Martinelli, F.: Partial model checking and theorem proving for ensuring security properties. In: Proceedings of the 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 44–52 (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Mayrhofer, R., Gellersen, H.: On the security of ultrasound as out-of-band channel. In: IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, IPDPS 2007, pp. 1–6 (March 2007)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Mayrhofer, R., Gellersen, H., Hazas, M.: Security by spatial reference: Using relative positioning to authenticate devices for spontaneous interaction. In: Krumm, J., Abowd, G.D., Seneviratne, A., Strang, T. (eds.) UbiComp 2007. LNCS, vol. 4717, pp. 199–216. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  18. Mayrhofer, R., Welch, M.: A human-verifiable authentication protocol using visible laser light. In: The Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2007, pp. 1143–1148 (April 2007)

    Google Scholar 

  19. Ritchey, R., Ammann, P.: Using model checking to analyze network vulnerabilities. In: Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, S P 2000, pp. 156–165 (2000)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Saxena, N., Ekberg, J.-E., Kostiainen, K., Asokan, N.: Secure device pairing based on a visual channel. In: 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 306–313 (May 2006)

    Google Scholar 

  21. Schwarz, B., Chen, H., Wagner, D., Morrison, G., West, J., Lin, J., Tu, W.: Model checking an entire Linux distribution for security violations. In: 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pp. 10–22 (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  22. Smetters, D.B., Balfanz, D., Smetters, D.K., Stewart, P., Wong, H.C.: Talking to strangers: Authentication in ad-hoc wireless networks (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  23. Stajano, F., Anderson, R.: The resurrecting duckling: security issues for ubiquitous computing. Computer 35(4), 22–26 (2002)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Suomalainen, J., Valkonen, J., Asokan, N.: Security associations in personal networks: A comparative analysis. In: Stajano, F., Meadows, C., Capkun, S., Moore, T. (eds.) ESAS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4572, pp. 43–57. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  25. Viehbƶck, S.: Brute forcing Wi-Fi protected setup, http://sviehb.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/viehboeck_wps.pdf

  26. Ware, C., Judge, J., Chicharo, J., Dutkiewicz, E.: Unfairness and capture behaviour in 802.11 adhoc networks. In: 2000 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2000, vol. 1, pp. 159–163 (2000)

    Google Scholar 

  27. Wi-Fi Alliance: Wi-Fi Protected Setup Specification, version 1.0h (2006)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

Ā© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Kersten, R., van Gastel, B., Drijvers, M., Smetsers, S., van Eekelen, M. (2013). Using Model-Checking to Reveal a Vulnerability of Tamper-Evident Pairing. In: Brat, G., Rungta, N., Venet, A. (eds) NASA Formal Methods. NFM 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7871. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38088-4_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38088-4_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38087-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38088-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics