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Potential Functions in Strategic Games

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Computer Science – Theory and Applications (CSR 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 7913))

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Abstract

We investigate here several categories of strategic games and antagonistic situations that are known to admit potential functions, and are thus guaranteed to either possess pure Nash equilibria or to stabilize in some form of equilibrium in cases of stochastic potentials. Our goal is to indicate the generality of this method and to address its limits.

This work was supported by the project Algorithmic Game Theory, co-financed by the European Union (European Social Fund – ESF) and Greek national funds through the Operational Program “Education and Lifelong Learning” of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) – Research Funding Program: Thales, Investing in knowledge society through the European Social Fund, and by the EU FP7/2007-2013 (DG CONNECT – Communications Networks, Content and Technology Directorate General, Unit H5 – Smart Cities & Sustainability), under grant agreement no. 288094 (project eCOMPASS).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Engineering and Informatics Department, University of Patras, Greece

    Paul G. Spirakis

  2. Computer Technology Institute & Press “Diophantus”, Greece

    Paul G. Spirakis & Panagiota N. Panagopoulou

Authors
  1. Paul G. Spirakis
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  2. Panagiota N. Panagopoulou
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computing Science, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, V5A 1S6, Burnaby, BC, Canada

    Andrei A. Bulatov

  2. Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Ural Federal University, 51 Lenina Ave., 620083, Ekaterinburg, Russia

    Arseny M. Shur

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Spirakis, P.G., Panagopoulou, P.N. (2013). Potential Functions in Strategic Games. In: Bulatov, A.A., Shur, A.M. (eds) Computer Science – Theory and Applications. CSR 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7913. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38536-0_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38536-0_25

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38535-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38536-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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