Abstract
In this paper we show how to argue about agreements based on dependence. First, we introduce a formal theory of arguing about agreements by instantiating Dung’s abstract theory of argumentation with proposals for agreements represented as dependence networks. Second, we show that acceptable agreements are exchange based—satisfying the so-called do-ut-des principle—and not redundant. Third, to further decrease the number of proposals, we define a notion of minimal proposals. Roughly, all proposals can be split into a number of minimal sub-proposals such that if the proposal is acceptable, then its minimal sub-proposals are acceptable too. We show that minimal proposals satisfy the indecomposable do-ut-des property, i.e., they cannot be split into two nonempty sub-proposals with at most one shared agent.
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Caire, P., van der Torre, L., Villata, S. (2013). Argumentation Theoretic Foundations for Abstract Dependence Networks. In: Chesñevar, C.I., Onaindia, E., Ossowski, S., Vouros, G. (eds) Agreement Technologies. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8068. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39860-5_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39860-5_14
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