Abstract
Anonymity in information systems has been a very active field of study in recent years. Indeed, it provides fundamental improvements in privacy by protecting users’ identities. However, it also serves as a shield for malicious parties, since it makes tracing users difficult. Many anonymous signature schemes and systems have been proposed to overcome this problem through the incorporation of some kind of credential revocation. However, these revocation functions have been proposed at a theoretical level or, at the most, as part of highly customized systems. Moreover, another critical requirement for any practical information system is usability, which calls for the standardization of the underlying primitives. In the context of the distribution and management of digital identities the most widely known standard is X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Several proposals have been made to extend X.509 certificates to support anonymous signature schemes. However, further work is required in order to succcessfully implement revocation functionalities in such environments. Since in X.509 the procedures for identity revocation mainly rely on either Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) or the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), we propose a set of extensions for both revocation standards in order to incorporate support for anonymous signature schemes. With these extensions, we achieve revocation functionality similar to that for current PKIs.
This work was supported by the UAM projects of Teaching Innovation and the Spanish Government projects TIN2010-19607 and MICINN BFU 2009-08473. The work of David Arroyo was supported by a Juan de la Cierva fellowship from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación of Spain.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ateniese, G., Camenisch, J., Joye, M., Tsudik, G.: A practical and provably secure coalition-resistant group signature scheme. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 255–270. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Au, M.H., Tsang, P.P., Kapadia, A.: Perea: Practical ttp-free revocation of repeatedly misbehaving anonymous users. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 14(4), 29 (2011)
Benjumea, V., Choi, S.G., Lopez, J., Yung, M.: Anonymity 2.0 – X.509 extensions supporting privacy-friendly authentication. In: Bao, F., Ling, S., Okamoto, T., Wang, H., Xing, C. (eds.) CANS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4856, pp. 265–281. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Benjumea, V., Choi, S.G., Lopez, J., Yung, M.: Fair traceable multi-group signatures. In: Tsudik, G. (ed.) FC 2008. LNCS, vol. 5143, pp. 231–246. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Camenisch, J., Krontiris, I., Lehmann, A., Neven, G., Paquin, C., Rannenberg, K., Zwingelberg, H.: D2.1 architecture for attribute-based credential technologies - version 1 (2011), https://abc4trust.eu/index.php/pub/results/107-d21architecturev1
Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A.: Dynamic accumulators and application to efficient revocation of anonymous credentials. In: Yung, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 61–76. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Camenisch, J., Michels, M.: Separability and efficiency for generic group signature schemes (extended abstract). In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 413–430. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Camenisch, J., Stadler, M.: Efficient group signature schemes for large groups (extended abstract). In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 410–424. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Chaum, D.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Commun. ACM 24(2), 84–88 (1981)
Chaum, D., van Heyst, E.: Group signatures. In: Davies, D.W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1991. LNCS, vol. 547, pp. 257–265. Springer, Heidelberg (1991)
Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., Polk, W.: RFC 5280: Internet x.509 public key infrastructure certificate and certificate revocation list (CRL) profile (2008)
Danezis, G., Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N.: Mixminion: Design of a type iii anonymous remailer protocol. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 2–15 (2003)
Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., Syverson, P.F.: Tor: The second-generation onion router. In: USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 303–320 (2004)
ISO/IEC: ISO/IEC CD 20008-1.2: Information technology - security techniques - anonymous digital signatures - part 1: General (2012)
ISO/IEC: ISO/IEC CD 20008-2.2: Information technology - security techniques - anonymous digital signatures - part 2: Mechanisms using a group public key (2012)
ISO/IEC: ISO/IEC CD 20009-1.2 draft: Information technology - security techniques - anonymous entity authentication - part 1: General (2012)
ISO/IEC: ISO/IEC CD 20009-2.2 draft: Information technology - security techniques - anonymous entity authentication - part 2: Mechanisms based on signatures using a group public key (2012)
Kiayias, A., Tsiounis, Y., Yung, M.: Traceable signatures. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 571–589. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Li, J., Li, N., Xue, R.: Universal accumulators with efficient nonmembership proofs. In: Katz, J., Yung, M. (eds.) ACNS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4521, pp. 253–269. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., Adams, C.: RFC 2560: X.509 internet public key infrastructure online certificate status protocol - OCSP (1999)
Pfitzmann, A., Köhntopp, M.: Anonymity, unobservability, and pseudonymity - A proposal for terminology. In: Federrath, H. (ed.) Anonymity 2000. LNCS, vol. 2009, pp. 1–9. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Reiter, M.K., Rubin, A.D.: Crowds: Anonymity for web transactions. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 1(1), 66–92 (1998)
Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A., Tauman, Y.: How to leak a secret. In: Boyd, C. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2248, pp. 552–565. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Shields, C., Levine, B.N.: A protocol for anonymous communication over the internet. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 33–42 (2000)
Teranishi, I., Furukawa, J., Sako, K.: k-times anonymous authentication (extended abstract). In: Lee, P.J. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3329, pp. 308–322. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Tsang, P.P., Kapadia, A., Cornelius, C., Smith, S.W.: Nymble: Blocking misbehaving users in anonymizing networks. IEEE Trans. Dependable Sec. Comput. 8(2), 256–269 (2011)
X.509, I.T.R.: Information technology – open systems interconnection – the directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks. Tech. rep. (November 2008)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Diaz, J., Arroyo, D., Rodriguez, F.B. (2013). Anonymity Revocation through Standard Infrastructures. In: De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Mitchell, C. (eds) Public Key Infrastructures, Services and Applications. EuroPKI 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7868. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40012-4_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40012-4_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40011-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40012-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)